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I. Introduction
The LGB rights movement is one of the great civil rights movements of our time.
Whereas the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the struggle to extend full recognition of AfricanAmericans’ citizenship and dignity, the past two decades have witnessed a similar struggle as the
nation has moved to accept LGB people1 and recognize their full citizenship. In the LGB rights
movement, perhaps the most visible issue for the last twenty years has been marriage equality.
The first cases suing for the right to marriage for LGB people were filed in the 1970s, but the
issue of marriage for same-sex couples only emerged into public view in the 1990s. Following
numerous losses in the first decades of marriage equality litigation, organizations litigating for
marriage equality and private advocates for marriage equality finally began winning cases in
courts across the nation.
This thesis draws on interviews with many of the main attorneys involved in the
organizations campaigning for marriage equality over the past two decades, many of whom run
such organizations. Using the information from those interviews, this thesis analyzes how the
organizations campaigning for marriage equality managed to win in court and protect those
victories from interference from other branches of government. To do so, this thesis focuses on
the intersection of law and politics in marriage equality litigation, the understanding of
organizations working toward marriage equality of that intersection, and the strategies of those
organizations that stem from an understanding of that intersection. This thesis analyzes both
legal and political strategies, as well as investigating the actual workings of the organizations
campaigning for marriage equality. In so doing, this thesis also addresses those organizations’
conception and reaction to the “backlash hypothesis” that dominates scholarly literature of the
marriage equality movement.
1

See definitions below.
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This thesis begins with definitions of key terms to avoid confusion, followed by a
discussion of the methods used in this study, followed by a review of the extant literature. Since
the law looks backward even as it advances, and since the lawyers interviewed for this study
referred to past cases and based their strategy on the cases’ outcomes, a short history of marriage
equality litigation follows the literature review. After that short history, the results of the
interviews are presented. I conclude that the organizations campaigning for marriage equality
have internalized the backlash hypothesis, and thus emphasize the political aspect of marriage
equality test cases. I also conclude that such organizations have politicized almost every aspect
of their work to both win and protect legal victories, turning such traditionally legal aspects of
litigation such as plaintiff selection, amici briefs and even legal arguments into political tools.
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II. Definitions of Key Terms
Many current scholars do not separate the concepts of “legal” and “political,” and instead
view them as two parts of the same whole. This is reflected in modern theories of attitudinalism,
which argues that legal decisions made by judges are actually political decisions. On the other
hand, the theories of historical institutionalism argue that judges make decisions based both on
policy preferences and the limits imposed by law and custom.2 Some scholars have even argued
that “Constitutional arguments are as much the stuff of politics as the pork barrel and the log
roll.…[B]asic constitutional institutions provide normative and procedural frameworks that allow
political debate.”3 This essay will deal with “legal” and “political” aspects of marriage equality
cases as separate entities, even though this essay will also discuss how every marriage equality
case has both legal and political aspects that must be attended to in order for advocates of
marriage equality to succeed.
In all the interviews conducted for this essay, the participants acknowledged that the
prevailing wisdom in the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation is that there are,
in fact, these two sides of every marriage case. According to most, this was a hard lesson
learned after the first marriage cases. In order to analyze political and legal aspects of marriage
equality cases, this essay separates them with the understanding that such a separation is merely
a device used for analysis, and not a division that is reflected at all times in campaigns for
marriage equality. The following definitions are definitions of key terms used in this essay, and
will govern the discussion of legal and political aspects of marriage equality cases.
A. Legal

2

Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber & Keith E. Whittington, American Constitutionalism, Volume I: Structures of
Government, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17.
3
Ibid., xx.
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For the purposes of this essay, the term “legal” shall refer to any actions that take place in
the judicial branch of government, and not in the elected branches of government or in relation to
popular referenda. As such, legal strategies are strategies that pertain only to arguments used in
courts of law. The legal aspects of the marriage cases discussed in this essay are the aspects of
the cases that occurred in courts of law, and not in legislatures or in the general public. Legal
arguments and strategies include arguing for heightened versus rational basis scrutiny of a law or
using Due Process arguments instead of Equal Protection arguments. There are aspects of the
cases discussed in this case that do not neatly fit into definitions of “political” and “legal”
without making definitions of those terms so wide as to rob them of meaning. Such aspects
include the timing of bringing a lawsuit and amici curiae briefs. The timing of a lawsuit may be
influenced by events outside the judicial branch in the public or in legislatures. However, since
the action of bringing of a case and its adjudication both occur in courts of law, such decisions
will be discussed as legal strategies. Similarly, as I will show, the marshalling of amici curiae
has overwhelmingly political overtones. Sometimes briefs filed by amici do not even make
legalistic arguments. However, since the briefs are filed with courts of law and are filed as
means to the end of influencing a lawsuit, amici briefs shall be discussed in terms of legal
strategy as much as possible.
B. Political
As mentioned above, legal actions occur in the judiciary. Political actions are actions that
occur in the elected branches of government and the general public, either in the context of a
popular referendum or not. Political aspects of the cases discussed in this essay include
grassroots organizing of volunteers to run the organizations that bring lawsuits, public advocacy,
lobbying in legislatures, and public education. Although actions taken in the elected branches
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have legal overtones because they deal with the creation of law and policy, such actions shall be
discussed as political strategies, since they occur solely in the elected branches. This essay is not
so much focused on the language of the laws enacted by referendum or legislative processes, but
on the process that led to that final product of a law. Another difficulty in this definition is the
use of amicus curiae briefs, a type of legal form, to make political points. As I will show, the
organizations litigating for marriage equality do this quite often. Amici briefs that are written to
rebut popular conceptions of LGB people, or to show that large swaths of society already support
marriage equality engage in political arguments. Amici briefs that make such arguments do not
argue along legal lines, such as advocating for a specific level of judicial scrutiny. Instead, such
briefs aim to show or build consensus. Thus, for the purposes of this essay, the term “political”
will also refer to attempts to reach consensus and to appeal to non-legal arguments.
C. LGB
In this essay, the acronym LGB is used to represent all people who self-identify as
lesbian, gay or bisexual, and are therefore likely to be either involved in or affected by the
lawsuits discussed in this essay. Although far more common acronyms are LGBTQ (Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, and Queer/Questioning) or just LGBT, I have decided
to use simply LGB. I made this decision with no intention of lessening other identities in
importance. Issues facing transgender and transgender persons are of immense importance, and
represent a still-developing and fascinating field of law and policy.4 However, such issues are
beyond the scope of this paper. This paper deals only with marriage, and transsexual/transgender
marriage is an issue too much in flux and too recently arrived at by the public conscious to be
4

See Anton Marino, “TRANSgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections Against Wrongful
Employment Termination on the Basis of the Transgender Identity,” Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 21,
no. 4 (2013): 865-893; Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, “Transgenderless,” Harvard Journal of Law &
Gender 35, (2012): 399-423; and Chinyere Ezie, “Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and
Sex Discrimination - The Need for Strict Scrutiny,” Columbia Journal of Gender & Law 20 (2011): 141.
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addressed in adequate depth in this study. As such, this essay shall use LGB as its acronym.5
This essay shall also use the term “marriage equality” except when interviewees mention
marriage equality by other terms. “Marriage equality” is now the preferred term for discussing
the goal of the movement, as opposed to “same-sex marriage” or “gay marriage.” The transition
from those two phrases to “marriage equality” was a slow process. As I will show, some
attorneys campaigning for marriage equality in the 1990s opposed the use of “same-sex” or “gay
marriage” as descriptors of their goals. To those attorneys, such terms were too narrow—they
saw themselves as fighting for marriage for everyone, regardless of sexual orientation, gender
identification, or any other characteristic. However, the terms “same-sex marriage” and “gay
marriage” were easier for the public to use, and so were used at first. Now, with the nation more
familiar and comfortable with marriage equality, and with the fine-tuning of the political
outreach of organizations working toward marriage equality, the term “marriage equality” has
gained popularity.
Throughout this essay I refer to the LGB community and the LGB rights movement,
more colloquially referred to as the gay rights movement. The LGB community exists more in
theory than in reality, and, as Aloni explains in words that apply as much to his as this essay,
This does not mean that a monolithic community of LGB individuals exists in any meaningful way. At
times, the multitude of interests within this community converge; at other times, they diverge
significantly. Acknowledging this to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout
this Article, and I attempt to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most
likely to diverge, especially vis-à-vis marriage.6
5

The use of LGB is not unusual, and Erez Aloni gave a wonderful explanation for its use, which also works in this
context:
“I use the term LGB to describe members who self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In doing so, I do not intend
to erase or obscure other identities.…This article does not refer specifically to transgender marriage because this
raises questions concerning a state’s definition of male and female. For some transgender individuals, the option to
marry already exists, even in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage. This is not to say that transgender
people do not have an interest in same-sex marriage, just that the rules for determining the sex of a person are
different from state to state and involve different sets of legal rules.” (Erez Aloni, “Incrementalism, Civil Unions,
and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,” Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy
18: 106n1).
6
Ibid.

10
The same may be said of the LGB rights movement, and even the much more recently arisen
marriage equality movement. The LGB rights movement has focused on as many goals as there
have been interests within the LGB community. These issues have changed over time, and
strategies have also changed. There are also many organizations working toward LGB rights,
each with their own mission and strategy. To talk of the LGB rights movement as monolithic
may be misleading, and the times when voices within the movement differed with each other
shall be duly noted. The movement toward marriage equality also contains many voices, groups
and strategies. Just as there is no monolithic LGB community or LGB rights community, there is
no monolithic marriage equality movement. In fact, until the late 1990s, the marriage equality
movement did not truly exist as a movement. Until that point, most work toward marriage
equality was done by organizations that were involved in the LGB rights movement and private
attorneys. By 2014 there are many organizations, such as Freedom to Marry, dedicated to
marriage equality, so one can properly talk of a “movement” for marriage equality. Of course,
that movement works toward a single goal – marriage equality – but it does not move as a single
unit on every case, law and situation. The main organizations that have worked toward marriage
equality (Lambda Legal, the ACLU’s Gay, Lesbian, Transgender & AIDS Project, Freedom to
Marry, Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, the Human Rights Campaign and the National
Center for Lesbian Rights) provide much of the guidance, funding, and litigation for the broader
campaign, but other parties, such as private attorneys and individuals are also important actors. I
shall be clear when organizations undertook certain strategies and campaigns, as opposed to
private individuals. I shall also be clear when organizations working for LGB rights and
marriage equality had internal differences of note, and when they did not.
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III. Methods
The principle sources for this thesis are structured qualitative interviews of six named
attorneys and one unnamed attorney involved with marriage equality litigation, along with
secondary sources, such as legal briefs, academic works, law review articles, and court decisions.
To best understand the meshing of legal and political strategies, the interviews focused on those
topics and their intersection. The interviews stressed both the interpretive “how” and
experiential “what” questions.7 The author conducted all interviews, and all recordings and
transcriptions of the interviews are held on file with the author.
The interviewed attorneys that wished to be named in this study were Susan Murray (one
of the lead attorneys in Baker v. State of Vermont), Beth Robinson (another lead attorney in
Baker and now Associate Justice on the Vermont Supreme Court), Mary Bonauto (Civil Rights
Project Director at Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders), Evan Wolfson (longtime attorney
at Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and founder of Freedom to Marry), Kevin
Cathcart (Executive Director of Lambda Legal) and James Esseks (Director of the ACLU’s
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & AIDS Project). I also interviewed one attorney who did
not want to be named in this thesis. Where that person’s comments appear, this thesis will
merely note the date of the interview, offering no other identifying facts.

7

James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, “Active Interviewing,” in Darin Weinberg, ed., Qualitative Research
Methods, (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 124.
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IV. Literature Review
A. Politics and Law in the Marriage Equality Movement
This thesis addresses the broad question of the interaction and place of law and politics in
reform movements. There is agreement among scholars that the two are inextricably linked in
the campaign for marriage equality, even though both organizations and private attorneys have
focused on litigation. Thomas Keck has argued that law and politics are linked, and that insisting
otherwise ignores “the causal significance of the litigation campaigns.”8 Stephen Engel found9
an empirical basis for the link between public opinion and gay rights litigation. Engels
discovered that, no matter what the outcome of a case, public opposition to gay rights increased
after court rulings.10 Scott Cummings and Douglass NeJaimie argued11 that politics and public
opinion could not be separated in a study of the marriage equality litigation in California. Thus,
they included not only litigation but also the political maneuvering and public advocacy that
accompanied it in their sweeping account of the Californian marriage equality litigation
campaign.12 Dale Carpenter has also argued that the lawyers involved in the landmark decision
of Lawrence v. Texas had to carefully control access to the plaintiffs, and continue to do so
today.13 Carpenter argued that the lawyers did this to control the political messages surrounding
the case, as the plaintiffs themselves were not the most exemplary individuals.14
Daniel Pinello has also demonstrated15 the intense political activity that accompanied the

8

Thomas Keck, “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights,” Law & Society
Review 43, no. 1 (2009): 151-186.
9
In “Frame Spillover: Media Framing and Public Opinion of a Multifaceted LGBT Rights Agenda,” Law & Social
Inquiry 38, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 403-441.
10
Ibid., 405.
11
In “Lawyering for Marriage Equality,” UCLA Law Review 57 (2010): 1235-1331.
12
Ibid.
13
Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas: How a Bedroom Arrest Decriminalized Gay
Americans, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012), 70-74.
14
Ibid., 91.
15
In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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marriage equality litigation in Massachusetts in 2004. Beth Robinson, one of the lead attorneys
in Baker v. State of Vermont, has also shown16 the intense lobbying and political maneuvering
that accompanied the litigation in Baker after the Vermont Supreme Court ordered the legislature
to find a solution to the problem of the denial of marriage to same-sex couples. Mary Bonauto, a
lead attorney in Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), has also argued17 that the
political progress the LGB rights movement had made in Massachusetts, such as with
employment non-discrimination law, made the victory in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health possible.
Despite the consensus that law and politics are connected in the marriage equality
litigation campaign, there is little research on whether key actors, such as directors of
organizations and the lawyers at such organizations, agree that there is a connection between the
two. Since there has been no research done on what attorneys involved in this litigation think on
this subject, there has been no research on how such thinking affects strategies in the
organizations litigating for marriage equality. There is also no research on how those
organizations handle activity that blurs the already oft-elusive line between law and politics, such
as amicus briefs. Finally, there is no research on what the state of the interaction between law
and politics is in the campaign for marriage equality now. There is no research on the effect
recent swings in public opinion and victories for the cause of marriage equality have had on the
strategies of the organizations that have worked toward that goal. This thesis will address and
seek to fill each of those gaps in the literature.
B. Backlash
Backlash, one of the visible manifestations of the interaction of law and politics, is more
16

In “The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont,” Seton Hall Constitutional Journal 11
(Spring, 2001): 237-257.
17
In “Goodridge in Context,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 40 (2005): 10-21.
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often discussed because of its practical implications. Anyone approaching the subjects of issue
litigation, reform movements, and the marriage equality litigation campaign specifically must
confront the issue of the backlash hypothesis, which features prominently in the literature on
such subjects. Vesla M. Weaver, in an article about elite whites’ reactions to civil rights
advances by black Americans in the 1960s, defines the term in the following manner: “Backlash
is the politically and electorally expressed public resentment that arises from perceived racial
advance, intervention, or excess.”18 Backlash in the context of the LGB rights movement and the
marriage equality litigation may be defined in the exact same manner, substituting the LGB
population into the definition instead of racial groups.
Perhaps the two most vocal proponents of the backlash hypothesis are Gerald N.
Rosenberg and Michael J. Klarman. Rosenberg’s famous book The Hollow Hope, when
originally published in 1991, focused on the backlash from various types of issue litigation,
especially that surrounding the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. According to
Rosenberg, the litigation that led to Brown v. Board of Education was practically meaningless.
In Rosenberg’s analysis, only after the U.S. Congress and executive agencies in the federal
government set about enforcing Brown in the mid 1960s did the Supreme Court’s decision carry
any meaning. The second edition of The Hollow Hope extended that hypothesis to marriage
equality litigation in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts from 1993 to 2004.19 According to
Rosenberg, the victories for marriage equality in Hawaii (Baehr v. Lewin), Vermont (Baker v.
State of Vermont), and Massachusetts (Goodridge v. Department of Public Health) all came at a
terrible cost. The victory in Hawaii was immediately erased by popular referendum and

18

Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American
Political Development 21 (Fall 2007): 237.
19
The Hollow Hope: Can Court Bring About Social Change? 2nd edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2008).
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subsequent legislative action. The partial victory in Vermont was achieved only to have the
Democrats (most of whom had supported the civil union bill of 2000) lose control of the
Vermont House of Representatives in the 2000 elections. Furthermore, by 2006, forty-five states
and the federal government had adopted measures to define marriage as the union of one man
and one woman.20 This trend only got worse after Goodridge, for in 2004, eleven states ratified
amendments to their constitutions defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.21
Rosenberg even goes so far as to say that the placement of marriage amendments on the ballot in
2004 may have cost Democrats key elections that year, including the presidential election.22
Similarly, Klarman has argued23 that the litigation surrounding Brown v. Board of
Education did more harm than good. The Supreme Court’s ruling against school segregation
based on race sparked massive southern resistance and undermined the efforts of white
moderates by polarizing the politics of race. Perhaps the most ostentatious example of the
resistance Brown sparked was the “Southern Manifesto” in which southern Senators and
Representatives pledged to overturn the Brown decision “by any lawful means.”24 In a more
recent article,25 Klarman extended his backlash hypothesis to the marriage equality litigation in
Massachusetts in 2003. According to Klarman, the “most significant short-term consequences of
Goodridge, as with Brown, may have been the political backlash that it inspired.”26
The backlash hypothesis has a neat logic. According to the backlash hypothesizers,
advances on marriage equality that came before public support was present for such a move met

20

Ibid., 363-364.
Ibid., 364.
22
Ibid., 375.
23
In “Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement,” Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 7-150.
24
This may be found at Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 102, part 4 (March 12, 1956): 44594460.
25
“Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),” Michigan Law Review 104 (2005): 431-489.
26
Ibid, 482. However, as will be discussed below, Klarman has recently changed his thinking on the backlash
hypothesis as applied to the marriage equality movement.
21
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with electorally expressed resentment and possible reversal. Other scholars who support the
backlash hypothesis include political scientist Mark Carl Rom,27 historian John D’Emilio28 and
political scientists Karen O’Connor and Alixandra B. Yanus.29 Each bases their analysis of the
campaign for marriage equality on the backlash hypothesis and offer techniques to avoid
backlash. The four scholars recommend a much more political strategy for the organizations
campaigning for marriage equality, instead of a litigation-heavy strategy.
On the other hand, there are many scholars who do not accept the backlash hypothesis’s
narrative of litigation inevitably meeting with either immediate meaninglessness or electoral
reversal. Ellen Ann Andersen has argued that “there are at least some circumstances in which
reformers can be served by turning to courts,” and uses the very cases that Rosenberg cites as
evidence that courts can bring about “favorable shifts in the legal and cultural frames
surrounding gay rights.”30 Carlos A. Ball, who also examines Brown and other cases the
backlash hypothesizers focus on, agrees with Andersen, and argues31 that backlash is a natural
part of controversial litigation, but that the campaign for marriage equality has made real gains
despite resistance. Patricia A. Cain agrees, arguing32 that backlash happens in all civil rights
movements, but that the real measure of a movement’s strength is the steps forward it takes
against the headwind of backlash. Similarly, William N. Eskridge, Jr. argues33 that, while Baehr
produced debilitating reversals for LGB people, it did prepare the ground for Baker in Vermont.
27

In “Introduction: The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage,” in The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, edited by Craig A.
Rimmerman & Clyde Wilcox, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1-38.
28
In “Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage,” in The Politics of SameSex Marriage, 39-64.
29
In “’Til Death—or the Supreme Court—Do Us Part: Litigating Gay Marriage,” in The Politics of Same-Sex
Marriage, 291-312.
30
Ellen Ann Andersen, Out of the Closets & into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structures and Gay Rights
Litigation, (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), 216.
31
In “The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its
Aftermath,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 14 (2006): 1493-1538.
32
In “Contextualizing Varnum v. Brien: A ‘Moment’ in History,” Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 13 (2009): 2758.
33
In Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights, (New York: Routledge, 2002).
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More recently, Eskridge has argued34 that most backlash hypothesis scholarship confuses
backlash with normal politics, and argues that litigation has significantly advanced the cause of
marriage equality. In the same vein, Daniel Pinello has argued,35 based on numerous interviews
with main actors in the marriage equality movement, that the Goodridge decision accomplished
real good for LGB people, and that it inspired elites and grass roots to mobilize across the nation.
Taking an international perspective, Miriam Smith has argued36 that the more successful
Canadian marriage equality movement has relied on litigation just as much as the American
movement, leading her to suggest that litigation does not always lead to backlash in marriage
equality cases. Keck has also argues37 that, empirically, backlash has not been nearly as serious
or prevalent as Rosenberg and Klarman make it out to be, especially in the cases of
Massachusetts and Vermont. In their sweeping survey of California marriage equality
litigation,38 Scott L. Cummings and Douglas NeJaime conclude that the backlash hypothesis
overstates its claim. Specifically, evidence from California’s extensive marriage equality
litigation, which eventually led to In Re Marriage Cases and Proposition 8, does not support the
claim “that the court decision caused the bad outcome.”39 Furthermore, Cummings and
NeJaimie point to evidence from California and Maine’s efforts to legislate marriage equality as
proof that the backlash hypothesizers forget that legislative action can lead to the same negative
political ramifications as litigation.40 Perhaps the most impressive argument against a rigid and
robust backlash hypothesis is Michael Klarman’s more recent work. Since the publication of the

34

In “Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States,”
Boston University Law Review 93 (2013): 275-323.
35
In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage.
36
In Political Institutions and Lesbian and Gay Rights in the United States and Canada, (New York: Routledge,
2008).
37
In “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decision on LGBT Rights.”
38
“Lawyering for Marriage Equality.”
39
Ibid., 1323.
40
Ibid., 1324 & 1325.
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articles mentioned previously, Klarman has argued41 that backlash only comes when losers in
court cases are committed, organized and geographically concentrated. Klarman even concludes
that, although the road to success has been fraught with peril for LGB people and their allies,
marriage equality litigation has been successful and beneficial.
Part of Klarman’s about-face perhaps came from the rapid progress the marriage equality
movement made in 2013, which cast serious doubt on the applicability of the backlash
hypothesis to the marriage equality litigation campaign. The backlash hypothesis emerged in the
2000s. Klarman’s article supporting the backlash hypothesis with an analysis of Goodridge’s
aftermath was published in 2005. The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, to which Rom, D’Emilio,
O’Connor and Yanus all contributed pieces of scholarship, is a veritable jeremiad lamenting the
reality of the backlash hypothesis. That collection of pro-backlash hypothesis scholarship was
published in 2007. The next year, in 2008, Rosenberg published the second edition of The
Hollow Hope, arguing strongly in favor of the backlash hypothesis in relation to the marriage
equality litigation campaign. In that year, the backlash hypothesis, at least superficially,
appeared quite valid. By 2008, the movement had only managed to achieve real marriage
equality in Massachusetts and had never won a political battle over marriage, such as a
referendum. However, in 2009, Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia all
brought about marriage equality through political channels.42 Since then, the marriage equality
movement has won many political and legal victories and has seen the percentage of Americans
in support of marriage equality rise to over fifty. Given the current climate surrounding marriage
equality, the arguments in favor of backlash are less empirically intuitive.

41

In From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
42
15 V.S.A. § 8 (amended 2009); 43 R.S.A. § 457 (amended 2009); and The Associated Press “Washington, D.C.,
Recognizes Same-Sex Marriages,” The New York Times, July 7, 2009.
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Bonauto has briefly addressed the backlash hypothesis directly,43 arguing that there is no
real backlash to marriage equality litigation. Instead, Bonauto argues that the negative political
agitation around marriage litigation is more “‘lash’ than ‘backlash’” since many right-wing
organizations have mobilized against marriage equality before litigation ran its course, as if the
mere suggestion of equality is enough to provoke further lashing by those opposed to marriage
equality.44 Bonauto’s comments on the backlash hypothesis are the only such comments from an
attorney involved in marriage equality litigation in the literature. There has been little to no
research on what activists think of the hypothesis. There is no research specifically on whether
or not the backlash hypothesis features in organizations’ strategic calculus, and, if so, how. This
thesis will seek to begin to fill this gap in the literature.
While there has been no research on the backlash hypothesis’s place in the strategizing of
the organizations working toward marriage equality, there has been debate over the role of civil
unions. Civil unions may be seen as a strategy by which to mitigate the backlash from marriage
litigation, since civil unions avoid using the term “marriage” in reference to same-sex couples.
Eskridge has argued45 that civil unions are necessary to build the requisite political support for
marriage equality. Ronald Shaiko, writing years after Eskridge, agrees with this conclusion.46
Other scholars have argued against this “incrementalist” approach. One such scholar is Erez
Aloni, who, in a cross-national study of marriage equality movements,47concludes that civil
unions are actually a stumbling block on the road to full marriage equality. Marriage equality
activists have also been vocally opposed to civil unions. As early as 2001, Beth Robinson
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argued that “civil unions would not be the end of the line” after the Vermont state legislature
enacted the first-in-the-nation civil unions law in 2000.48 Bonauto has also made her opposition
to civil unions well known in her writings.49 However, given the recent massive shifts in public
opinion, there has been no work done on the place of civil unions in the current strategy of the
organizations working toward marriage equality. This thesis seeks to rectify that.
There is also little research on the role of courtroom defeats in the strategy of
organizations advocating marriage equality. This deals with a different type of outcome than the
backlash scholarship, since litigation defeats must be dealt with completely differently than
political ramifications of judicial decisions. Steven A. Boutcher argued that50 losses in court
give substantial mobilizing power to social movements. NeJaime also studied51 the effect of
losses in litigation on the LGB rights movement and concluded that such losses actually provide
effective talking points and rallying cries for movement organizations. This thesis will fill the
gap on what the organizations working toward marriage equality do when defeat comes in the
form of an adverse judicial decision, and not just as political fallout from a positive judicial
decision.
C. Legal Strategy
There is extensive literature on what the legal advocates for marriage equality should do
and what they have done in terms of legal strategy. However, there is no research on the effect
political strategies had on legal strategies or vice versa. The Harvard Law Review published an
entire note in its June 2004 edition on how litigators could attack the federal Defense of Marriage
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Act.52 The Harvard note advanced both Due Process and Equal Protection – on rational basis
grounds no less – challenges to DOMA. Other scholars, such as Courtney A. Powers, have
argued53 that the LGB community must be found a suspect class by courts in their equal
protection analysis, thus triggering heightened or strict judicial scrutiny of laws affecting LGB
people. Kenji Yoshino also argued54 during the 1990s in favor of finding the LGB community a
suspect class. However, Yoshino has more recently switched to arguing55 that Due Process, or at
least “liberty-based” arguments, may fare better in the current federal court system, especially in
the Supreme Court. Yoshino points out that the Court has shown a recent tendency to reject
Equal Protection civil rights arguments, but has accepted Due Process or liberty-based civil
rights claims. Evan Wolfson, founder of Freedom to Marry, has argued56 that marriage is a right
and should be won with arguments about its inherent importance to liberty and freedom. These
can be either Due Process arguments or fundamental rights arguments in Equal Protection
jurisprudence. Bonauto has also supported fundamental rights arguments based on Due Process
in support of marriage equality.57 She has also explained why she believes sex discrimination
arguments are weak. In her analysis, both men and women are disadvantaged, so no sex-based
argument may be made.58 Bonauto has also supported Equal Protection arguments, emphasizing
that all courts should follow the example set in Romer, in which the Supreme Court used rational
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basis scrutiny, but still struck down an anti-gay referendum in Colorado.59
Despite this and other debate over both the proper arguments to use and the reasoning
courts and attorneys have used, there is little research on how, if at all, the political and the legal
strategies of the organizations litigating marriage equality interact. This thesis will fill that gap
by examining how, if at all, the political and legal strategies of such organizations influenced
each other.
D. Political Strategy
As mentioned earlier, most scholars have argued that the political and legal sides of the
campaign for marriage equality are inextricably linked. They have both explicitly and implicitly
argued in that vein by discussing the political maneuvers of the organizations that advocate for
marriage equality along with their legal maneuvers. Beth Robinson explained,60 just after the
enactment of civil unions in Vermont, some of the grass roots organizing, political mobilization
and lobbying that accompanied the litigation in Baker v. State of Vermont. Bonauto has also
explained61 some of what GLAD did to prepare for Goodridge in Massachusetts, as well as what
GLAD did afterwards to ensure there was no political derailment of the progress to marriage
equality. Among scholars, Pinello has done the most to demonstrate the political strategies and
actions of the organizations and individuals working toward marriage equality.62 However, his
study on the matter, which, like this paper, uses interviews intensively, is now many years out of
date. The rapid changes in public opinion over the last decade and changes in the methods of
litigation require a revisiting of the material Pinello covered years ago. This thesis will also fill
the gap left by the silence of many activists on what exactly they do to politically mobilize the
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LGB community and its allies. This thesis will also fill the gap in the literature on how
organizations that advocate for marriage equality attempt to reach out to other, non-LGB groups
in society so as to win them over.

24
V. A Short History of Marriage Equality Litigation
A. Overview
Kevin Cathcart, the Executive Director of Lambda Legal, explained in an interview with
the author that “every victory stands on the shoulders of a bunch that came before.”63 According
to Cathcart, the burst of litigation in 2013 after U.S. v. Windsor was in part due to the favorable
decision in Windsor, but also due to favorable decisions from years before. Looking ahead,
Cathcart predicted that every case filed until the Supreme Court rules affirmatively on marriage
equality will also talk about Lawrence v. Texas, Romer v. Evans, and others. Furthermore, the
members of the organizations that advocate for marriage equality have learned just as much, if
not more, from their defeats than from their victories. Those members of such organizations
look back across decades of litigation to craft current and future strategy. As such, past cases
feature prominently in attorneys’ thinking. To properly understand the current and even future
strategies of organizations advocating for marriage equality, one must first understand the major
marriage equality cases of the past. These cases are highly complex, but a short description of
each will suffice for current purposes. This list of cases should not be seen as an exhaustive
archive of all marriage equality litigation. Such an exhaustive study is beyond the scope of this
paper. Only cases that are indicative of broader, important trends, or cases that feature
prominently in present-day strategizing will be analyzed. Each of these cases, as will become
clear in the comments of the current leaders of the organizations involving in marriage equality
litigation, continues to impact the strategies of those organizations.
B. The First Cases (1970-1985)
Individuals and organizations have utilized litigation in their attempt to achieve marriage
equality since the 1970s. Some of the first gay rights cases were marriage cases filed in that
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decade. The first marriage cases came soon after the Stonewall Riots in New York City during
June 1969, which scholars cite as the start of the modern LGB rights movement.64 The new LGB
rights movement hoped to model itself after the Civil Rights Movement, and thus also turned to
litigation as well as direct action.65 However, the first cases brought to court met with almost
derisive rejection from the various courts that dealt with them. The first two decades of marriage
equality litigation thus ended with no legal progress for the same-sex couples in court and little
success in state legislatures. However, the filing of marriage cases did move marriage equality
into public debate. Although success was not forthcoming, visibility was.
The first marriage equality case was Baker v. Nelson,66 which was filed in Minnesota,
reaching in the state’s supreme court by 1971. The two plaintiffs in the case, “Richard John
Baker and James Michael McConnell, both adult male persons, made application to [the]
respondent, Gerald R. Nelson, clerk of Hennepin County District Court, for a marriage license”
but Nelson declined to issue one on the grounds that the laws of Minnesota did not allow for
same-sex marriages.67 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that, although the laws of Minnesota
did not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages, “a sensible reading” of the applicable statute – i.e.
one relying on a 1966 dictionary definition of the word marriage as the union of a man and a
woman – disclosed a legislative intent to limit marriages to heterosexual couples.68 Furthermore,
the unanimous opinion held that the marriage statutes, as they stood and as they were interpreted,
did not violate any provision of the United States constitution.69 Appealed to the United States
Supreme Court due to rules that mandated appeal of all state supreme court decisions that dealt
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with constitutional objections to laws, Baker was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.70 This dismissal was essentially a ruling upon the merits of the case, and it made the
decision of the Minnesota court binding precedent.71
The next major marriage equality case was Jones v. Hallahan,72 which reached the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1973. In Jones v. Hallahan, two women sued the clerk of the
Jefferson County Court after he refused to issue a marriage license to them.73 The Court of
Appeals relied on definitions of marriage found in common dictionaries, legal dictionaries, and
encyclopedias. Based on these authorities, the court held that the women had no constitutional
claim since marriage had always been understood as the union of one man and one woman.74
The court also relied on Baker v. Nelson, which it treated as binding precedent on the
constitutional issues (i.e. violation of the freedom of religion, freedom of association, the right to
marry and the Eighth Amendment) raised by the two women.75 In this way, the first marriage
equality case decided the outcome of the second marriage equality case.
The third marriage equality case in the 1970s was also decided along the same lines as
Baker v. Nelson and Jones. That third case, Singer v. Hara,76 reached the Washington Court of
Appeals for the First District in 1974. Messrs Singer and Bartwick applied for a marriage license
from Lloyd Hara, the auditor of Kings County in Washington. When Hara refused to grant one,
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Singer and Bartwick sued.77 The Court of Appeals held that the laws of Washington did not
allow same-sex marriages and that such a prohibition did not violate the Equal Rights
Amendment of the Washington constitution or the federal constitution: “The ERA [Equal Rights
Amendment of Washington] provides, in relevant part: Equality of rights and responsibility
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.”78 Like Jones, Singer relied on
the previous marriage cases of the 1970s – Jones and Baker were cited thrice by the Court of
Appeals.79 Singer was appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, but the appeal was
summarily rejected in 1974.80
C. Victory and Defeat in the Shadow of Bowers (1986-2002)
Due to the failure of the first three marriage equality cases, there was no major litigation
for marriage equality until the early 1990s. However, in the late 1980s, the United States
Supreme Court handed down a decision in Bowers v. Hardwick81 that dramatically changed LGB
rights activists’ strategic outlook and the environment around LGB rights in general. Bowers
was not a marriage equality case, but it was litigated by some of the biggest players in the LGB
rights movement, and it dealt with the issue of sexual intimacy among same-sex couples.82 At
the heart of Bowers was whether a state could criminalize consensual homosexual sex.83 Mr.
Hardwick had been charged under a Georgia statute passed in 1819 that criminalized sodomy,
with the possible maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.84 The Supreme Court rebuffed
the arguments of Mr. Hardwick and his counsel that such a law violated the Fourteenth
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Amendment of the federal constitution. According to the majority opinion, authored by Justice
Byron R. White, “To claim that a right to engage in such conduct [consensual homosexual
sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”85 Perhaps even more damaging was the concurrence of
Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wrote that prohibitions of sodomy have “ancient roots,” doing
little to disguise his disdain for homosexuals.86 Such pronouncements from the highest court of
the land, to say nothing of the actual upholding of Georgia’s statute, did terrible damage to
efforts to advance LGB rights. For years, Bowers hung like a pall over the entire gay rights
movement and influenced all of the strategies employed by its leaders.87
Despite the severe defeat the LGB rights movement had suffered in Bowers, just a few
years after Bowers was handed down, another wave of marriage equality litigation began. On
December 17, 1990, three same-sex couples in Hawaii filed for marriage licenses, only to be
rejected by the state Department of Health.88 Those same couples sued in state court to obtain
those licenses, and in 1993 the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered a decision on the issue in Baehr
v. Lewin.89 The court held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that the
sex-based discrimination found in the Hawaii marriage statutes was subject to strict scrutiny in
Equal Protection jurisprudence.90 As such, the suit was remanded to the trial level, where the
state would have “to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572–1 [Hawaii’s marriage statute
wa]s unconstitutional by demonstrating that it further[ed] compelling state interests and [wa]s
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narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights.”91 This was a
stunning victory for advocates of marriage equality, because it was the first time a court at any
level had agreed with at least one of their arguments.
While Baehr was a victory in the Hawaii Supreme Court, after the ensuing trial an even
more favorable ruling augmented that triumph. Judge Gary Chang held that, in light of the
higher court’s ruling on the same suit, the marriage statutes of the state of Hawaii violated the
state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.92 Judge Chang further ordered that the Department
of Health cease withholding marriage licenses from same-sex couples.93 This meant that the
three couples that had applied for marriage licenses six years previously could finally get their
licenses. However, that was not to be, for the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr had
touched off a firestorm of anti-LGB sentiment across the nation. By the time of Judge Chang’s
order, the political branches of the state and the nation were arrayed against the Baehr plaintiffs.
In September 1996 the United States Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman for
the purposes of the federal government (i.e. spouses on tax returns and spousal benefits from
welfare programs), and also allowed states to disregard same-sex marriages formalized in other
jurisdictions.94 The debates over the Defense of Marriage Act featured unvarnished homophobia
and bigotry in the chambers of Congress and led to a law that imposed a serious impediment on
the work of individuals and organizations litigating and agitating for marriage equality.95
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States throughout the union also adopted “mini-DOMAs,” state-level laws that restricted
the definition of marriage to the union of one man and one woman.96 This was the start of the
first wave of anti-marriage equality state legislation during the 1990s and early 2000s. As the
table below illustrates, numerous states adopted mini-DOMAs in the 1990s due to the fervor
over Baehr. After Brause, and especially after Goodridge, which will be discussed later, states
began ratifying constitutional amendments to prohibit recognition of same-sex unions.
Table 1: Statutory and Constitutional State Responses to Marriage Equality Cases97
Year

States’ Prohibitions of Marriage Equality

1995

Statute: Utah

1996

Statute: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota and Tennessee

1997

Statute: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota
and Virginia

1998

Statute: Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky and
Washington
Amendment: Alaska

1999

Statute: Louisiana and Vermont

2000

Statute: California, Colorado, Idaho and West
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Virginia
Amendment: Nebraska
2002

Amendment: Nevada

2004

Amendment: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi,
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon
and Utah

2005

Amendment: Kansas and Texas

2006

Amendment: Alabama, Idaho, Colorado, South
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wisconsin

2008

Amendment: Arizona, California and Florida

2012

Amendment: North Carolina

As shown in the table above, closer to home for the plaintiffs in Baehr, a state
constitutional amendment in 1998 authorized the legislature to define marriage as between a man
and a woman, which the legislature had already done.98 Thus, when the Hawaii Supreme Court
once again reviewed the case in 1999, it reversed the decision of Judge Chang.99 After nearly a
decade of litigation, those Hawaiian couples did not receive the licenses they so desperately
wanted. To this day, attorneys in organizations litigating for marriage equality cite Baehr as the
reason those organizations adopt strategies that are not merely legal in content. As will be
discussed below, lawyers associated with such organizations almost uniformly argue in favor of
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public education and public advocacy campaigns based on the unfavorable political fallout from
Baehr.
While Baehr worked its way through the state court system of Hawaii, other marriage
equality cases were litigated across the country, with varying degrees of success for the
advocates of marriage equality. In 1995, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in Dean
v. District of Columbia that there was no “no statutory violation or denial of due process” in the
District’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.100 In 1998, Judge Peter A. Michalski
of the Alaska Superior Court held in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics that marriage was a
fundamental right, which meant “the state must therefore have a compelling interest that supports
its decision to refuse to recognize the exercise of this fundamental right by those who choose
same-sex partners rather than opposite-sex partners.”101 Judge Michalski then arranged for
hearings on whether the state could meet such a high burden as providing a compelling interest
for such a policy.102 Before anything more could occur, the people of the state of Alaska ratified
a constitutional amendment that defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman.103
Just like Baehr in Hawaii, Brause in Alaska offered a glimmer of hope for the cause of marriage
equality that was short-lived and erased by political action in response to the courtroom victory.
There was one major court case in which the LGB rights movement made considerable
progress in the 1990s. As the federal Defense of Marriage Act was debated in Congress, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Romer v. Evans.104 Romer stemmed from a
referendum in Colorado, which was passed after several local governments in that state passed
anti-discrimination ordinances to protect the LGB population. The referendum ratified an
100
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amendment (“Amendment 2”) to the Colorado constitution that prohibited such laws.105 Several
LGB individuals and municipalities then filed suit against the state of Colorado, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the new amendment. The Supreme Court, through Justice Anthony
Kennedy, was unequivocal in its rejection of the new amendment. The Court concluded:
That Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause [.]106

This was a major victory for the LGB rights movement, since the Court applied rational
basis scrutiny to the Colorado amendment, the mildest possible constitutional test for legislation,
and still found it to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, even
under rational basis review, a law based on “animus toward the class it affect,” would not survive
judicial scrutiny.107 The decision was immediately recognized as a threat to anti-gay legislation.
The import of Romer was so quickly grasped that the House Committee on the Judiciary
included it in its report of the Defense of Marriage Act to the full House of Representatives. The
committee argued that Romer did not disallow DOMA.108 This assertion was put to the test, as
will be discussed later, a little more than a decade later.
Marriage equality advocates had little to show for its efforts in the 1990s, the victory in
Romer notwithstanding. On the other side of the continent from the defeats in Hawaii and
Alaska, though, marriage equality advocates were able to secure a victory at the end of the
decade. On December 20, 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court handed down its decision in State
of Vermont v. Baker.109 Filed on behalf of three sets of same-sex couples that were denied
marriage licenses, the court in Baker rejected the plaintiff’s claim that they were entitled to
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marriage licenses under the then-existing statutory scheme governing marriage.110 However, the
court did “Conclude that none of the interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just
basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a civil
marriage license under Vermont law.”111
The court ordered the state legislature to implement some sort of scheme to extend to
same-sex couples the benefits granted to opposite-sex marriage couples. The court did not
endorse marriage, civil unions or reciprocal benefits as the preferred remedy, merely indicating
that the legislature had to extend the benefits in one way or another.112 In 2000, the Vermont
House Judiciary Committee spent six weeks hearing testimony and crafting a law that created a
parallel legal structure to marriage.113 Eventually, after several tense and close votes, the
Vermont legislature enacted, and Governor Howard Dean signed, a civil union law that extended
the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, but did not refer to such unions as
marriages.114 Despite the fact that marriage did not come from Baker and its ancillary
legislation, the civil union bill was nonetheless a tremendous victory for marriage equality
advocates.
The marriage equality litigation campaign had two lasting victories in the Bowers era –
Romer v. Evans, which forbade states from explicitly denying a particular population enhanced
protection under the law, and Baker v. State of Vermont, which paved the way for the Vermont
legislature to craft civil unions. As will be discussed below, both scholars and attorneys in
marriage equality litigation saw civil unions as a necessary stepping-stone to some on the road to
full marriage equality. The marriage equality litigation campaign did suffer many stinging
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defeats in the Bowers era. The short-lived victories in Hawaii and Alaska were swiftly reversed
by the state legislatures, and states across the nation moved to preemptively ban same-sex
marriage recognition before any such marriages could occur. The federal government was not
immune to this reaction. DOMA became a major imposition to marriage equality advocates and
same-sex couples across the nation for over a decade. Throughout the decade, Bowers hung like
a cloud over all marriage litigation attempts. However, the civil unions of Vermont and the
continuing marriage litigation and debates in legislatures brought the issue further into public
view. Civil unions also proved that the benefits of marriage could withstand application to samesex couples, even if the name of marriage was not similarly applied.
D. The Advent of Marriage Equality: the Lawrence and Goodridge Era (2003-2007)
After Baker and the subsequent passage of Vermont’s civil union legislation, there were
no major decisions dealing with marriage equality for a couple of years. Then, in 2003, two
decisions of great importance, and one decision of lesser import were handed down. These cases
brought about true marriage equality, even though that advent was in turn greeted by a massive
surge in statutory and constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the states. Despite the
political losses of the mid-2000s, the advocates for marriage equality did manage to achieve a
major goal they had striven for – actual marriage equality at the state level.
The first decision of 2003 was not a marriage case at all, but a case revisiting the sodomy
laws upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick. During the night of September 17, 1998, police raided the
apartment of John G. Lawrence in Houston, Texas to find, according to a report filed shortly
thereafter, Lawrence having anal sex with a man named Tyron Garner.115 The two were
subsequently charged with violating Texas’s homosexual conduct law.116 After various appeals,

115
116

Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 61, 84.
Ibid. 80. The statute still exists, and may be found at Texas Penal Code § 21.06(a).

36
the case reached the United States Supreme Court, and the decision in Lawrence v. Texas was
handed down on June 26, 2003.117 The Court’s six-justice majority, through Justice Anthony
Kennedy, was unequivocal: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.”118 The Court then struck down Texas’s homosexual conduct law.119 Despite this
sweeping language, the Court’s majority in Lawrence was also quite cautious. Justice Kennedy
followed his statement on Bowers with the following caveats.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve
public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.120

Gay rights advocates, who had crowded the Court’s gallery in anticipation of this decision,
openly sobbed as Justice Kennedy read the highlights of his decision aloud.121 The destruction
of sodomy statutes had been a goal of the LGB rights movement for decades, and at last it had
come to pass.122
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Lawrence, in which he argued that the
decision called into question many state laws that had their basis solely in morality, such as
prohibitions of same-sex marriage.123 Although the majority decision claimed that the
nullification of Texas’s homosexual conduct statute did not validate marriage equality, Justice
Scalia told Court observers, “do not believe it.”124 Even the eminent justice could not have
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foreseen how prescient his words were, nor how quickly other courts would have to wrestle with
the issue of marriage equality in the light of the decision in Lawrence. In October 2003,
Lawrence was cited in the decision of Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa,
which dealt with two gay men who applied to get a marriage license in Arizona three days after
Lawrence was handed down.125 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that there was no
fundamental right to same-sex marriage and that the prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally
furthered the legitimate state interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing in stable
homes.126 However, what marriage equality advocates lost in Arizona was more than made up in
Massachusetts that same year.
Mere weeks after the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled against two gay men seeking
marriage licenses, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of seven same-sex
couples trying to do the same. Although the organization Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders (GLAD) filed the lawsuit that would become Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health127 two years before Lawrence was decided, the opening passages of the Goodridge
decision borrowed heavily from Lawrence.128 The Supreme Judicial Court, through Chief
Justice Margaret H. Marshall, ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the civil
institution of marriage was “incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect for
individual autonomy and equality under law.”129 After ruling same-sex couples must be
admitted to the institution of marriage, the court stayed its decision by 180 days “to permit the
Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light if this opinion.”130 As with
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Baker in Vermont, Goodridge was a victory for marriage equality advocates, but immediately
involved the legislature.
At first, the Massachusetts legislature tried to create Vermont-style civil unions. In order
to comply with the Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts Senate submitted a question to the
Supreme Judicial Court on the constitutionality of such a scheme.131 The justices replied that
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it
continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status. The holding in Goodridge, by which we
are bound, is that group classifications based on unsupportable distinctions, such as that embodied in
the proposed bill, are invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution. The history of our nation has
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.132

Stymied, the Massachusetts legislature tried to begin the process of amending the state
constitution to overturn Goodridge. This and other attempts to stave off issuance of licenses to
same-sex couples came to nothing, and those licenses were issued starting on May 17, 2004.133
At long last, after thirty years of litigation and untold years of suffering, the advocates of
marriage equality achieved the victory they so desperately desired. Massachusetts served as a
beachhead for marriage equality, but it was a precarious one, and the marriage equality activists
would have to wait for years for such a victory to come again.
After Massachusetts allowed marriage equality during 2003-2004, Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah, and Oregon
all ratified amendments via referendum to their respective constitutions banning same-sex
unions.134 This marked a dramatic escalation from the merely statutory definitions of marriage
as the union of one man and one woman that had followed Baehr but preceded Goodridge. In
the face of these laws and amendments, three same-sex couples in Indiana challenged that state’s
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statutory mini-DOMA, but were eventually stymied by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Morrison
v. Sadler.135 The court held that the DOMA of Indiana did not violate the Equal Protection or
Privileges and Immunities clauses of the Indiana constitution, nor did it violate the Due Process
guarantees of that constitution.136
That same year, as the same-sex couples lost in Indiana, another group of same-sex
couples was challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage in Oregon. The case arose when
county officials in Multnomah County (home of Portland, Oregon) issued marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. This was part of the “Winter of Love” in 2004 in which numerous local
authorities issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples without explicit permission from the
states to do so.137 In Oregon, Multnomah County, several couples, and organizations all filed
suit against the state of Oregon to uphold the validity of those licenses.138 The suit that led to Li
v. State of Oregon139 began before the people of Oregon ratified a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage in 2004, but was decided by the state supreme Court in 2005. The
Supreme Court of Oregon held that all marriages in Oregon were both statutorily and
constitutionally limited to unions of opposite-sex couples and refused to entertain the notion that
benefits of marriage could be separated from the legal civil institution.140
Across the continent, advocates for marriage equality ran into resistance in another
generally liberal state, New York. A massive, multi-county litigation campaign, waged by many
of the largest organizations involved with marriage equality litigation, reached its apogee in 2006
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when the decision in Hernandez v. Robles was handed down by the Court of Appeals of New
York State.141 The decision opened with one succinct paragraph:
We hold that he New York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members
of the same sex. Whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the
Legislature.

This was a stinging defeat for the organizations working toward marriage equality. The
Hernandez litigation had involved multiple organizations and forty-four couples.142
Organizations advocating for marriage equality immediately altered their strategies in New York
in reaction to the Hernandez decision, focusing on the legislature.143
Across the Hudson River in New Jersey, the advocates for marriage equality suffered a
similar setback that same year. Years earlier, seven same-sex couples tried to get marriage
licenses in New Jersey, but were rejected, and sued in what would become Lewis v. Harris when
the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down its decision in the matter in 2006.144 The court held
that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that the withholding of the
benefits of marriage from same-sex couples was unacceptable under the New Jersey
constitution’s guarantee of equal protection to all.145 As such, the court ordered the state
legislature to either emend the marriage statutes of New Jersey to include same-sex couples, or
create “a separate statutory structure, like civil unions,” within 180 days of the decision.146 This
led the New Jersey legislature to enact a civil union bill, which became law in 2007.147
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The marriage equality litigation did not meet with much success in Washington during
2006. In Andersen v. Kings County,148 the Washington Supreme Court dealt with the state’s
mini-DOMA. Although the plaintiff couples had won a victory at the trial level, the higher court
decided that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not violate any provisions of
the state’s constitution.149 As with Hernandez in New York, marriage equality advocates in
Washington switched strategic focus after Andersen, eventually turning toward the initiative
process.
Another litigation defeat in a state that would eventually adopt marriage equality was in
Maryland in 2007. In Conaway v. Deane, the Court of Appeal of Maryland, the state’s highest
court, ruled that the marriage statutes of the state, under which same-sex couples could not
obtain licenses, were constitutional.150 The court held that same-sex marriage was not a
fundamental right, that homosexuals were not a suspect class or quasi-suspect class, and thus the
exclusionary marriage statutes were valid under rational basis constitutional review.151
Specifically, the court found that the state’s interest in promoting procreation was a valid reason
under rational basis review, allowing the statutes to stand.152
As the first decade of the new millennium wound down, marriage equality supporters
could claim an important victory in Massachusetts with the actual advent of true marriage
equality. The broader LGB rights movement also managed to secure a key victory in Lawrence
with the abolition of anti-sodomy laws. Other opportunities for success in traditionally liberal
states, such as Washington, New York and New Jersey, did not end with marriage equality in
those states, but the push for marriage equality was building momentum across the continent.
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E. Victory in Connecticut and Iowa, but Reversal in California (2008-2009)
The year 2008 proved to be an epochal moment for marriage equality, and was a year of
immensely important litigation. First, the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in
In re Marriage Cases,153 which dealt with the constitutionality of statutorily excluding same-sex
couples from the civil institution of marriage. The court found that the right to marry the spouse
of one’s choice was a fundamental right, and the sex of one’s spouse did nothing to abrogate that
right.154 The court also found that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, which
warranted strict scrutiny in California jurisprudence.155 Based on this, the court struck down the
existing statutory scheme and ordered marriage extended to same-sex couples across the state.156
Suddenly, the most populous state in the union allowed same-sex couples to wed with the
protections and benefits previously granted solely to opposite-sex couples. In response to this
ruling, a massive political campaign resulted in Proposition 8, a voter-approved constitutional
amendment, being ratified later on November 4, 2008.157 Proposition 8 constitutionally defined
“marriage” as the union of one man and one woman in California.158 Just as sudden as the
advent of marriage equality was in California, so too was its departure.
On November 5, 2008, three organizations involved in marriage equality litigation –
Lambda Legal, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the American Civil Liberties Union –
filed suit in state court challenging the validity of Proposition 8.159 The California Supreme
Court eventually decided in favor of Proposition 8’s constitutionality in Strauss v. Horton160 in
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2009. The day after Strauss was decided and Proposition 8 upheld under state law, two lawyers
from outside of the organizations involved in the marriage equality litigation campaign– Ted
Olson and David Boies – filed a lawsuit challenging Proposition 8 in federal court. More shall
be said of that suit further on in this discussion. Despite the fact that Olson and Boies were
nationally known and highly competent constitutional lawyers, there was great unease in
organizations that had worked for the cause of marriage equality for years about their case. LGB
rights groups claimed not to have known Olson and Boies were filing a lawsuit. On the same
day Olson and Boies filed their suit, a group of such organizations issued a statement titled “Why
the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should be the Next Step on Marriage in California.”161 The
organizations eventually took on advisory and amici roles in the federal lawsuit challenging
Proposition 8, although they did attempt to formally intervene when Olson and Boies voiced
opposition to the prospect of an actual trial on the merits of Proposition 8.162 The federal district
court rejected their motion to intervene in the case, relegating them permanently to amici
roles.163
While organizations working toward marriage equality and the nation focused on
California to see what would come of marriage equality there, litigation continued on the east
coast. Although Connecticut had enacted a civil unions law in 2005, Gay & Lesbian Advocates
and Defenders filed suit in state court on behalf of eight same-sex couples for full marriage
benefits, including the name of marriage.164 The Connecticut Supreme Court handed down its
decision in that suit, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, in 2008. The court held that
the existence of civil unions was not enough for the then-existing statutory scheme to avoid
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inflicting a demonstrable injury on same-sex couples.165 Furthermore, the Court held that the
marriage statutes discriminated based on sexual orientation, which is a quasi-suspect
classification eligible for intermediate scrutiny under Connecticut law, and that the state failed to
provide a sufficient justification for such discrimination.166 In 2009, the legislature enacted a
gender-neutral marriage statutory scheme that allowed for same-sex couples to be married under
Connecticut law.167 Thus, Connecticut became the third state after Massachusetts and California
to adopt marriage equality, although at that time California’s constitution still prevented samesex couples from entering into civilly recognized marriages.
While the legislature of Connecticut enacted a marriage statute that allowed same-sex
couples to civilly wed, the Supreme Court of Iowa, to the surprise of many, handed down a
decision that mandated marriage equality in that state.168 Iowa had enacted a mini-DOMA in
1998, but six same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in the mid-2000s nonetheless.
When county officials refused to issue licenses to them, in accordance with the law, those
couples sued.169 That suit was decided in 2009 as Varnum v. Brien by Iowa’s highest court. The
court held that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, triggering intermediate scrutiny
under Iowa law.170 The marriage statute of that time was found to discriminate based on sexual
orientation, could not withstand intermediate scrutiny, and thus was struck down.171 The court
then remedied the injury inflicted on the plaintiff couples by admitting them and all other samesex couples into the civil institution of marriage.172 Despite efforts by conservatives in the
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legislature, the court’s order withstood all attempts to overturn it in the elected branches.173 By
judicial fiat, Iowa unexpectedly became the fourth state to adopt marriage equality.
The advents of marriage equality in Iowa as well as Connecticut, and even the short-lived
victory in California, were massive steps forward for the cause of marriage equality. Although
California turned out to be a stinging political loss in 2008, the Proposition 8 campaign did
display the vicious and ugly homophobia that many Americans could have ignored or tolerated
previously. The loss on Proposition 8 also radicalized many LGB people who were either not
involved in the campaign for marriage equality or were only weakly involved before 2008. In
this way, as will be discussed in the context of the attorneys’ experiences, Proposition 8 became
a defeat for the advocates of marriage equality that did have some benefits.
F. The Attack on DOMA, Section 3, and the Advent of Marriage Equality in California:
(2010-June 2013)
In the two years after Proposition 8 there was a massive shift toward federal litigation in
the marriage equality litigation campaign. The focus of the marriage equality litigation also
moved to the federal DOMA, which had been passed due to the first victory for marriage
equality advocates in Baehr. Eventually, one such challenge to DOMA reached the Supreme
Court in the form of U.S. v. Windsor. The lawsuit of Olson and Boies also progressed in federal
district Court, moving on to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and then the Supreme
Court. The years from 2010 to 2013 were filled with triumphs for the marriage equality
litigation campaign and paved the way for an onslaught of private litigation after June 2013.
These years proved to be the turning point for marriage equality, as legal victories easily
withstood any political reactions.
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Organizations such as GLAD and Lambda Legal filed numerous lawsuits challenging the
federal DOMA. Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management174, Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management175, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,176 Windsor v.
United States177, Dragovich v. Department of Treasury178 and Golinski v. U.S. Office of
Personnel Management179 were filed in rapid succession. Massachusetts was not filed by an
organization or a private individual, but by Attorney-General Martha Coakley of Massachusetts.
Coakley, on behalf of the state of Massachusetts, argued that DOMA violated the principles of
federalism, since the states have held the power to define marriages within their boundaries since
colonial times.180 The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts agreed, as did the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.181 However, the suits brought by organizations argued against DOMA,
section 3, which prohibited the federal government from recognizing as a marriage any union
that was not of one man and one woman, on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds. Due to
the fact that there is no Equal Protection Clause that applies to the federal government, the
lawsuits only invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which many Supreme
Court decisions have interpreted as having Equal Protection aspects.182
There had been legal challenges to DOMA before this flurry of litigation in 2009. In
early 2004, Smelt v. County of Orange emerged after a California same-sex couple applied for a
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marriage license and were denied one.183 The plaintiffs attacked both California state laws and
DOMA. In their challenge to DOMA, they argued the law violated “due process, equal
protection, and the right to privacy” and constituted sex discrimination.184 The district court
dismissed the case for lack of standing, but did adjudge DOMA to be constitutional.185 The
second challenge in 2004, Bishop v. United States, argued DOMA violated both the equal
protection principles of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the same.186 Bishop
was only decided in U.S. District Court on January 14, 2014, as shall be discussed later.187
Setbacks and delays plagued another early case, Torres-Barragan v. Holder, which challenged
DOMA on the grounds that the plaintiffs were an international same-sex couple, and one was
prohibited to name the other as an immediate relative.188 Despite these impediments, the
marriage equality litigation campaign forged ahead with its assault on DOMA as the second
decade of the twenty-first century began.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned litigation against Proposition 8 continued in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. A massive trial was held before Judge
Vaughn Walker from January 11 to January 27, 2010, in which the defenders and challengers of
Proposition 8 called dozens of witnesses.189 Since many of the state officials named in the
lawsuit as defendants refused to defend Proposition 8, a group called “Yes On 8” headed by one
Dennis Hollingsworth became the intervenor-defendants.190 On August 4, 2010, Judge Walker
handed down a sweeping decision that struck down Proposition 8. Judge Walker held that
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Proposition 8 did not even have a rational basis for existence, and that it violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.191 The proponents of Proposition 8 pressed ahead and
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The decision from that court will be discussed
below with the discussion of the progression of Windsor to the Supreme Court.
The assault on DOMA was somewhat complicated on February 23, 2011. On that date,
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that President Obama had ordered the Department
of Justice not to defend DOMA in cases in the Second Circuit because both the president and the
attorney-general had decided DOMA should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny, as
opposed to rational basis review.192 This meant that Pedersen and Windsor, which the marriage
equality advocates had won at the district court level, would not be appealed to higher courts to
create binding precedent. In addition to refusing to defend DOMA in the Second Circuit, the
Department of Justice submitted briefs in all other DOMA cases arguing in favor of heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation classification and against the constitutionally of DOMA.193 Since
the Department of Justice no longer defended DOMA in Pedersen and Windsor, the House of
Representatives organization the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
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Representatives (BLAG) to defend the law as an intervenor-defendant. With this new party to
the litigation, Windsor progressed from the Southern District of New York’s district court, to the
Second Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court. At issue at all stages of the litigation was section
3 of DOMA, which defined the word “marriage” as found in federal statutes as the union of one
man and one woman. Section 2 of DOMA, which allows states to ignore same-sex marriages
solemnized in other states, was not at issue.
Traveling on a similar track, Perry wound its way through the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. On February 7, 2012, a three-judge panel of that court issued a decision affirming the
decision of Judge Walker.194 The decision of the judges was rather narrow – in fact, it did not
fully address the arguments for the right to marriage that Judge Walker had. Instead, the appeals
court found that Proposition 8 violated U.S. Supreme Court case law, specifically Romer v.
Evans, and that voters could not negatively target a specific group with legislation like the voters
of California had done in Proposition 8.195 Specifically, the Court of Appeals cited the fact that
the state of California had granted the right to marry to same-sex couples, but had then rescinded
that right.196 The case was then appealed to the U.S Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court heard the arguments for both Perry and Windsor on back-to-back
days in March 2013 and handed down the decisions for both on June 26. In Perry, the Court did
not reach the merits of the case. Instead, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John
Roberts, Jr., the Court ruled that the petitioners (“Yes on 8”) did not have standing in the
Supreme Court or in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.197 As such, the decision from Judge
Walker of the U.S. District Court stood, allowing the plaintiffs and all other same-sex couples in
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California to marry. In Windsor, the Court actually did address the merits of the case in a
majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The Court held that “DOMA…violates
basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government,” and
thus struck it down.198 This was an epochal day for the cause of marriage equality, for not only
had the Supreme Court struck down a discriminatory state law, but also a discriminatory federal
law, with much farther-reaching implications. Attorneys disagree on what exactly led to the
victory in Windsor, but many credit the “ dual track” political-legal strategies implemented by
the organizations working toward marriage equality after the lessons learned in relation to Baehr.
G. The Windsor and Perry Era: (July 2013-December 2013)
Following the decisions in Windsor and Perry, there was a veritable explosion of
litigation in state and federal courts attacking the validity of bans on marriage equality. There
were also many cases filed seeking to enforce provisions of the decisions. In states across the
nation, private attorneys, outside of the organizations that had brought most of the litigation
before Windsor, brought dozens of cases in opposition to state constitutional and statutory
prohibitions of same-sex marriage. Most of these cases were in federal court, but other cases
were filed in state courts. These cases produced a wave of victories for the cause of marriage
equality across the nation, even in traditionally deeply conservative states.
One of the first big victories for the advocates of marriage equality after their twin
victories in the summer of 2013 was in New Jersey. In Garden State Equality v. Dow, six samesex couples filed a lawsuit against the state of New Jersey averring that the conferral of civil
unions (as mentioned above in the discussion of Lewis v. Harris) but not marriage violated their
equal protection rights.199 Judge Jacobson of the New Jersey Superior Court for the Mercer

198
199

U.S. v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (slip op. 20).
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. 2013).

51
Vicinage agreed and ordered that the state to provide marriages, not just civil unions, to samesex couples.200 Crucial to the court’s analysis was the fact that Windsor struck down section 3 of
DOMA, extending all the federal benefits conferred by marriage to same-sex married couples.
Since only marriages, and not civil unions, received those federal benefits, there was a different
injury than when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Harris. 201
Although the New Jersey state government at first appealed the decision directly to the
state’s supreme court, the government dropped the appeal on October 21, 2013.202 The
government’s sudden reversal may be attributed to strong signs from the New Jersey Supreme
Court that such an appeal would not go well for the state. The strongest such signal was a
unanimous decision from the court denying the government’s motion to stay the order of Judge
Jacobson mandating the state to provide marriage licenses to same-sex couples by October 21.
Speaking with one voice, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, “We can find no public
interest in depriving a group of New Jersey residents of their constitutional right to equal
protection while the appeals process unfolds.”203 Attorneys for the State of New Jersey probably
read that language and realized the court would find against the state. In this way, New Jersey
achieved marriage equality mere months after Windsor and Perry were decided.
After New Jersey, which many thought would swiftly achieve marriage equality through
one means or another, two massive shocks came in the form of victories in federal court in Utah
and Oklahoma. On December 20, 2013, Judge Robert J. Shelby of the U.S. District Court for
Utah handed down a decision in Kitchen v. Herbert striking down the statutory and constitutional
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prohibitions of same-sex marriage in Utah.204 At least one of the plaintiff couples had applied
for a marriage license before Windsor and Perry were decided, but in wake of those cases, Judge
Shelby held that Utah’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated both equal
protection and due process.205 He subsequently ordered the state to issue marriage licenses to
any same-sex couples that requested them. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed
Judge Shelby’s order on January 5, 2014, 1,362 same-sex couples were married in Utah in the
window of opportunity that order provided.206 The second shock that came in the wake of
Windsor and Perry was the resolution of Bishop v. United States in Oklahoma. As mentioned
earlier, Bishop was filed in 2004 as an attack on section 3 of DOMA. However, in the decade it
took to resolve the case, the Supreme Court struck down section 3 of DOMA in Windsor, making
the original claim moot. Thus, on January 14, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma handed down a decision on a different issue: the state of Oklahoma’s
denial of marriage to same-sex couples. The decision struck down the state’s prohibitions on
same-sex marriage, but immediately stayed the order to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. This immediate stay was due to the stay imposed on the order in Kitchen by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which oversees all federal districts in Oklahoma.207 Bishop may be
finally resolved when the Tenth Circuit hands down a decision in Kitchen.
To this day marriage equality cases are being filed in states across the nation, both by
organizations and by private attorneys with no ties to the major organizations involved in
marriage equality litigation. Although the political work associated with marriage equality is
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still mostly done by those major organizations, the marriage equality litigation campaign now
involves many attorneys outside those organizations. Cases range from enforcement cases in
states wherein marriage equality is already a reality to groundbreaking test cases in states that
have not achieved marriage equality. Although this subsection ends the Windsor and Perry Era
in December 2013, in reality that era continues. Such an end-date merely serves to provide an
end to this short history of marriage equality litigation. This thesis cannot keep pace with the
changes coming every day to the legal landscape on this issue, but this bit of historical context
should provide background for the discussions of the lawyers presented in the next section.
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VI. Results and Analysis
A. The Unity of Politics and the Law
As mentioned previously, there is an understanding in the literature that there are two
sides to every test case, especially in a marriage equality test case. The legal side of the case,
which occurs in the courtroom and the judicial system, is only half of the process of bringing a
test case for marriage. The other half takes place in the political sphere, in the form of political
reactions that reverse courtroom victories, or in the resistance of state officials after a victory has
been won. All of the people interviewed for this study agreed that there were these two sides to
the litigation for marriage equality. To some, to merely refer to the two as “sides” was too
compartmentalizing. In fact, everyone agreed that the prevailing wisdom in the organizations
that litigation for marriage equality is that one must address both sides (or aspects) in order to
win. One attorney involved with such organizations went so far as to say that the organizations
have focused far more on the political side of test cases than the legal side. Furthermore, almost
universally, the interviewees cited the negative reactions to Baehr in the 1990s as the defining
moment in the creation of the marriage equality litigation campaign when attorneys realized the
political side of test cases could not be ignored. This shows that marriage equality advocates and
the organizations they work for are highly aware of the interaction between politics and the law,
and that they attempt to manage both sides simultaneously, even when doing things that are at
least superficially either wholly political or wholly legal.
Susan Murray, who was one of the lead attorneys in Baker v. State of Vermont in the
1990s, said that in Baehr it was clear “there hadn’t been a lot of groundwork laid in the
community, so that case, even though it had been successful at the trial court level, ended up
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getting short circuited by a constitutional amendment.”208 Thus, it was clear that Murray and her
co-counsel needed to pursue a “dual track” for every case – being mindful of political issues and
legal arguments – and needed to “lay the groundwork” in a variety of ways before filing.209 The
Vermont campaign for marriage equality followed the ancient maxim that one must “know
thyself.” Thus, the first political groundwork began with talking to gays and lesbians to figure
out what issues were important and getting them to talk about them. Murray attributes this first
step in Vermont to the passage of an anti-discrimination law in 1991 that protected gays,
lesbians, and transgender individuals.210 This law allowed the LGB community to come out
safely. It was after the passage of this law that Murray and others could talk about why marriage
was important to LGB people.211
Mary Bonauto, the Civil Rights Project Director at Gay & Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders (GLAD) and co-counsel to Murray in Baker, echoed Murray’s analysis. Bonauto
argued, “Hawaii was sprung on us,” because three couples went to a private attorney who
plunged into a lawsuit with no preparation.212 The third co-counsel in Baker, Beth Robinson
(now an Associate Justice on the Vermont Supreme Court), also explained that “as early as the
early ‘90s, before we did the things we did in Vermont,” many in the organizations involved in
marriage equality litigation were keenly aware of the need for “dual track” management of
cases.213 After the fallout of the Baehr litigation, Bonauto, Murray, and Robinson undertook an
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extensive public education and advocacy campaign in Vermont before they filed any lawsuit.214
According to both Murray and Bonauto, this campaign involved going to multiple community
organizations to educate them on the plight of the LGB population due to their exclusion from
the institution of marriage. The first to be contacted were the traditional allies of LGB peoples –
“the Human Rights Commission, the ACLU and the UU Church, people like that.”215 After that,
groups like the Rotary Clubs of towns, which Murray described as “less comfortable groups”
were informed of the discrimination LGB people faced.216 To ensure their message was widely
disseminated, Murray, Bonauto and Robinson set up a booth at every county fair in Vermont. At
the booth, a seventeen minute video played in which LGB people talked about how they were
“actually harmed” by the state’s denial of marriage to them.217
To manage all of this, the three attorneys resurrected an organization called the Vermont
Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights (VCLGR), which had been instrumental in the passage of
the 1991 anti-discrimination law mentioned previously.218 This organization ran the early
political and grassroots aspects of the marriage equality campaign in Vermont. Starting in 1993,
the VCLGR hosted annual town hall meetings to discuss issues, including the denial of marriage,
for the LGB population in Vermont.219 By 1995, hundreds of people at these town hall meetings
wanted to fight for marriage equality. Out of this desire, people in the VCLGR formed the
separate Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce (VFMT), which became its own independent
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entity in 1996.220 The VFMT then took over the litigation and grassroots organization for the
marriage equality campaign in Vermont.
Murray and Robinson alone easily managed both the legal and political sides of the case
in Vermont, with help from Bonauto. The two Vermont attorneys, with assistance from
Bonauto, could manage the political outreach to community groups and legislators and the filing
of legal papers. According to all three, the small size of Vermont allowed the three of them to
manage the whole campaign. However, all three were clear that such centralized control would
be nearly impossible to replicate in larger, more populous states.221 Robinson went so far as to
say that “peoples’ skill sets have become much more specialized,” so such a model would not
work, even in Vermont, if an organization wanted to engage in litigation in a “state of the art
way” today.222 Although there were committees, a board, and dozens of volunteers for the
VFMT, Murray and Robinson ran the show.223
In litigation campaigns outside Vermont, lawyers echoed many of the sentiments Murray,
Robinson, and Bonauto voiced. Bonauto did mention that, in many of the cases she worked in
outside of Baker (i.e. Kerrigan and Goodridge), she oversaw public education campaigns similar
to that conducted in Vermont. Evan Wolfson, the founder of Freedom to Marry, is widely
credited with envisioning and proselytizing for the “dual track” management of political and
legal aspects of marriage cases, and he claimed to have argued for such strategy for twenty
years.224 This means he started at the same time the Baehr litigation worked its way through the
Hawaii courts.
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Kevin Cathcart, the Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
indicated that, in a significant amount of the litigation Lambda has been involved in (i.e. Varnum
v. Brien, Lewis v. Harris, Garden State Equality v. Dow, and In re Marriage Cases), there have
been “robust” educational campaigns to accompany the lawsuits.225 Of course, such could not be
the case with all the cases Lambda has taken to court – cases like Baehr and Lawrence had little
public education associated with them – but it was the general rule. According to Cathcart, not
only was “the Hawaii Case” the “textbook learning opportunity” for the organizations involved
in marriage equality litigation on the necessity of public education and political management
accompanying litigation, but also Varnum in Iowa.226 In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court handed
down a unanimous decision affirming marriage equality on constitutional grounds in Varnum.
However, in retention elections the next year, three justices were removed from the bench, due to
a campaign that focused on their votes in Varnum.227 This was the first time an Iowan justice
had ever lost a retention election.228 Cathcart described this as a “warning shot from the right
wing to try to intimidate judges” across the country.229
As the leader one of the organizations involved in advocacy for marriage equality, with
the lessons from Baehr and Varnum fully internalized, Wolfson indicated that different people
usually manage the political and legal aspects of marriage equality cases.230 As opposed to the
Baker litigation, wherein Murray and Robinson could manage the whole case, both legally and
politically, more recent litigation has public education staff manage the public education
campaign.231 Freedom to Marry does the public education and advocacy associated with test
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cases for marriage equality, but does no litigating, leaving that to organizations like GLAD, the
ACLU and Lambda.232 Bonauto indicated that, until Goodridge in 2004, she managed both the
political and the legal sides of litigation campaigns. However, after Goodridge, GLAD hired a
public affairs director due to the increased interest of the nation and the LGB community on
marriage cases.233 The public affairs director was technologically savvy, and was tasked with
getting the stories of plaintiffs out to the world.234 In fact, one attorney involved in marriage
equality litigation remarked that the focus in the organizations involved in marriage equality
litigation has shifted so far from the legal side of cases that more resources are poured into public
advocacy than ever before.235
Cathcart agreed with Wolfson, indicating that “different people do different things” but
that the whole process is coordinated.236 For Lambda Legal, the best way to accomplish public
education and advocacy is through “earned media” instead of the more grassroots methods that
Murray and Robinson utilized in Vermont.237 Earned media is coverage from the mainstream
media, in the form of newspapers covering the plaintiffs’ struggles or TV stations running stories
on the case and the individuals involved. This publicity is essentially free, and it allows Lambda
to “play” in expensive media markets. As Cathcart explained, “we don’t have the kind of
budgets to do advertising campaigns the way Diet Coke can do advertising campaigns,”
especially in the media markets of New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and other expensive
markets in which Lambda operates.238 To get earned media and to further public education,
Lambda conducts town hall meetings, brings plaintiffs to meet editorial boards and reporters,
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sets up interviews for TV stations, features plaintiffs in Lambda’s newspaper, brings plaintiffs to
meet state politicians and power players, and utilizes social media.239 For a lot of groundwork,
Lambda relies on and has worked with what Cathcart called the “Equality organizations” – the
LGBT rights organizations in each state.240
James Esseks, Director of the ACLU’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & AIDS
Project, went so far as to say that merely phrasing the political and the legal aspects of test cases
separately implied they were compartmentalized, which he insisted they were not in the
organizations responsible for marriage equality litigation.241 According to him, the prevailing
wisdom is that there are such various aspects of test cases.242 In agreement with Cathcart, Esseks
explained that the ACLU has different staffers doing different jobs, all related to the same case.
There are staff attorneys that work on litigation, staff attorneys that work on lobbying, policy
strategists that work on ballot initiatives and lobbying, and public communication strategists.
Esseks explained that all of these people were coordinated in individual states or on individual
cases to “move the ball forward” collectively.243
Although different people do different tasks in the organizations’ holistic strategy, the
need to attend to both politics and the law is taken as a given principle in the organizations
working toward marriage equality. The lessons of Baehr and Varnum were hard learned and
fully internalized. Organizations have never since attempted to bring a test case for marriage
without first conducting an extensive political campaign to prepare the public and the legislature
for the eventual litigation and the potential success of the movement in court. Since the law and
politics are so closely bound together in the thinking of these organizations, the next section
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analyzes the possible tensions between the political messages of the these organizations and the
legal arguments they made in court.
B. Potential Tensions Between Politics and the Law
While the attorneys in organizations involved in marriage equality litigation are aware
that politics and the law intersect in their work, they claimed they did not give much thought to
how the political and legal sides influenced each other. This is unsurprising, since few such
attorneys could be expected to explicitly state that their legal arguments were made for political
purposes, or that their legal arguments were guided by political considerations. One cannot
expect the attorneys in this study to explicitly criticize the activities of their allies as being too
overtly political or legal since everyone in the campaign for marriage equality does have a
common goal, despite some differences in strategy. According to most of the attorneys, the two
sides made the same arguments, though oftentimes with different emphases, and were never in
tension with each other.
Murray was clear that the legal and political sides of the campaign for marriage equality
made the same arguments to judges and the public at large, respectively.244 At no time during
the lead-up to the decision in Baker did the two sides “step on each other’s toes.”245 However,
the two sides had to use different styles of argument. The public political side of the campaign
told stories of the discrimination and injuries LGB people faced, while the legal side argued
those injuries were contrary to law or the constitution.246 According to Murray, “there are some
very subtle legal arguments you are making in any case, and that is not possible in public
advocacy. You need to say something that anyone can understand, so you have to be very broad-
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brush about it.”247 As an example, Murray explained that Robinson hated the term “gay
marriage,” because she thought she was just fighting for the right to marry for everyone.
Murray, on the other had, thought that “gay marriage” made sense to a lot more people than
something like “marriage equality,” and thus was comfortable with the former phrase.248
Bonauto offered a similar example when she explained that the organizations working
toward marriage equality realized the best way to talk about marriage with the public was not to
focus on the benefits one receives from the institution of marriage, but the fundamental right of
everyone to marry.249 Esseks likewise saw no influence or tension between the two sides, except
with regard to the nomenclature of what marriage equality advocates were striving for.250
According to Esseks, the advocates now seek and argue for “marriage equality” in legal
paperwork, not “gay marriage.”251
Wolfson agreed with Murray that the two sides of the campaign for marriage equality
never influence each other. In Wolfson’s work, the public education campaigns have always
been filled with concepts of liberty and equality, which are precisely the type of arguments that
marriage equality advocates make in the courtroom.252 There was never any influence that the
political side had on legal arguments that Wolfson saw, because, to him, the advances in the
political sphere simply “have strengthened and helped elevate a different emphasis” in the extant
legal arguments.253 Furthermore, “how people understand who gay people are…creates more
space for legal arguments,” but did not create new legal arguments.254 Cathcart agreed with
Wolfson, Murray and Esseks that the two sides did not influence each other. Cathcart does not
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believe that the two sides could influence each other because the constitutional arguments – the
right of all Americans to marry the person they love – are so clear-cut.255
Robinson was a dissenting voice among the attorneys involved in this study with regard
to any tensions that existed between the legal and political sides of the campaign for marriage
equality. Robinson explained that a tension did arise between the two sides when Vermont
enacted its civil unions law but other states either refused to recognize such unions or did not
have a set policy on doing so.256 “As an advocate who was thinking about legal strategy,”
Robinson had “to be very careful to leave the door open to the argument that a civil union is and
should be recognized in those [other] states” as the equivalent of a marriage.257 However, in the
political activity post-Baker, activists had to “talk about the ways in which civil unions fall
short…[to] persuade…fellow Vermonters that we need to keep moving toward marriage after
they did this heavy lift that became civil unions.”258 Robinson did not want the political activists
to simply say that civil unions were not recognized elsewhere because that would jeopardize the
legal arguments she wanted to make in favor of civil unions being recognized.259 Despite this,
the argument that resonated with, and received the most attention from, the public was that civil
unions were not recognized in other states as marriages.260
With Robinson as the exception, the attorneys in this study unsurprisingly could not come
up with an example of a time when the political message and the legal arguments of the
organizations campaigning for marriage equality overtly influenced each other. Further analysis
will show that the two sides do influence each other in the work of such organizations, but most
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of the attorneys did not explicitly discuss tensions between the legal and political aspects of
cases in a broad and abstract sense. According to most of the attorneys, the clarity of the
arguments the advocates of marriage equality must make – the right to marriage is fundamental
to all Americans, and no American should be treated differently than similarly situated
Americans – eased possible tensions between the two types of argument the organizations
advocating for marriage equality must make.
C. The Involvement and Issues of National Organizations
Marriage equality advocates face the issue of having only a handful of central
organizations, but fifty states in which to conduct marriage equality campaigns. The
involvement of national organizations in state marriage equality campaigns is a case-by-case
determination. According to Bonauto, the pushes for marriage equality in Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut were all locally controlled.261 In each of those state campaigns,
GLAD assisted state groups, but to different degrees. In Massachusetts, where GLAD is
headquartered, Bonauto and GLAD ran the entire operation, and only after the victory in
Goodridge, when “ the entire right wing of the nation was doing its damnedest to pull th[e]
victory out of the ground,” did national organizations like the Human Rights Campaign step in to
provide additional funding and support.262 Robinson, who only worked on Baker, explained that
the strategies associated with that litigation were entirely specific to Vermont, and that she,
Bonauto, and Murray ran the whole operation.263 Through Bonauto, GLAD was associated with
the Baker litigation and Vermont’s public education campaigns, but GLAD mostly focused on
the litigation aspects of the Vermont campaign.264 Additionally, Lambda, the NCLR, and the
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ACLU all filed amicus briefs in Baker, but such national or regional organizations did not run
the campaign in Vermont.265 In fact, Robinson argued that having “national groups come into
Vermont would be counter-productive” because of the fierce independence of Vermonters.266
Esseks agreed that all state campaigns, such as they existed, were state-specific, even if a
national organization such as the ACLU was involved. As an example, he cited the litigation in
New Mexico, which resulted in the ACLU and NCLR winning a complete victory in Griego v.
Oliver on December 19, 2013.267 Years before the paperwork for Griego was filed, the ACLU
and its allies conducted a massive political campaign in New Mexico. The national ACLU,
along with ALCU New Mexico, the NCLR, Equality New Mexico, and Freedom to Marry all
coordinated to spread the word on same-sex couples’ devotion to each other and the injuries they
suffered because of the denial of marriage to them by the state of New Mexico.268 The
organizations put several staffers on the ground in New Mexico to accomplish this and to build a
coalition of business owners, Hispanics, and conservatives in support of marriage equality before
the issue went to court.269 To spread the word, the staffers put on town hall meetings, set up
speakers’ bureaus, and worked to get newspapers to write on the couples in the lawsuit.270 This
is precisely the type of activity Cathcart described in Lambda’s public education and advocacy
campaigns.
As for what Cathcart had to say on the state-specificity of political campaigns
accompanying litigation, he prefaced his comments by noting that, until the past year, only a
handful of organizations, which coordinated closely among themselves, actually brought
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marriage cases to court.271 This has changed with the Windsor decision and the flood of private
litigation that followed. When the organizations brought litigation and executed a political
campaign to accompany it, they had to coordinate with the local and state LGB rights
organizations. This created some conflict. According to Cathcart, “there were times when
people in states would say, ‘we don’t want someone to bring a marriage case because we think
we could move a civil rights bill [through the state legislature]. Once marriage gets out there, it
gets harder…’”272 Some did not want national organizations to come in and “upend the cart” on a
long-term legislative project in a particular state.273 On top of that, people within the states
sometimes did not agree, and oftentimes states would have multiple LGB organizations.274
While Cathcart acknowledged this conflict and the need to form some sort of consensus with
state organizations, he did explain, “If we had to have consensus to move forward on litigation,
there wouldn’t be much litigation in this world, because consensus on anything is hard to come
by.”275 Wolfson agreed with Esseks and Cathcart, explaining that, while there may be statespecific plans and strategies, it is all part of the national plan to get marriage equality for all.276
Another issue the larger national organizations have to deal with is donors. The
organizations advocating for marriage equality get their funds from private donations, and each
attorney involved in this study had to deal with donors’ desires. According to Murray, Bonauto,
Robinson, and Esseks, donors to the organizations have not come to the organizations with
demands.277 Unsurprisingly, those four attorneys reported never having issues with donors who
refused to give money after a strategic decision was made, or who wanted a particular strategy as
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a condition of their donation.278 Bonauto did mention that such issues could arise and be a
problem if one were in charge of a small organization that depended on one or a few big
donors.279 However, since GLAD is a large organization with many donors, she has never faced
that problem in her work.280
Cathcart and Wolfson offered a slightly more complex picture of donor relations.
Wolfson explained that “different funders have different agendas and different
approaches…funders are all over the map.” However, Wolfson has worked hard with donors to
bring them around to one strategy. Wolfson credits the national organizations with succeeding in
persuading donors “to buy into a vision and a strategy and a campaign.”281 As such, Wolfson
has never had major issues with donors. Cathcart intimated that he and Lambda have not had
problems with individual donors, but have experienced issues with foundations that wish to
donate.282 Despite this, as Bonauto pointed out, donor issues only really become a big issue
when there are few donors. Cathcart’s Lambda Legal has plentiful and generous donors, which
allows Cathcart to say, “thanks but no thanks,” to foundations that demand certain things of
Lambda that its leadership do not think are prudent for the campaign for marriage equality.283
Another issue the organizations working toward marriage equality struggle with is
handling litigation that comes from outside the organizations that have historically brought most
of the litigation. This litigation can have the effect that Baehr did in Hawaii—the plaintiffs may
win, but if the political groundwork is not laid, it all may be for naught. However, simply
because litigation originates outside the organizations and is managed primarily by people who

278

Ibid.
Bonauto interview.
280
Ibid.
281
Wolfson interview.
282
Cathcart interview.
283
Ibid.
279

68
are not employed by such organizations does not mean that it will fail. As one attorney involved
with marriage equality litigation pointed out, Baker, the first case in which marriage equality
advocates won a permanent victory, technically came from outside the organizations dedicated to
marriage equality because none of the major organizations started it, although GLAD did assist
considerably through Bonauto.284 With regard to non-organization litigation, both Murray and
Bonauto said, “You can’t stop someone from filing a lawsuit,” but explained that private
litigation outside of the organizations that have had a lot of experience with marriage equality
litigation can be managed to maximize its effectiveness.285 Bonauto explained that the
organizations do “engage with them [private attorneys] about the issues…engage them about the
strength of their arguments [and] make them think more contextually.”286
Wolfson agreed with this, saying that the organizations work quite closely with each
other to bring effective cases, but that they do not have a “monopoly on who has access to the
courts.” In the cases in which private attorneys bring litigation, the organizations, “try to
persuade them to bring more strategic cases…and not necessarily go to court just because you
have a very legitimate and real grievance, but to understand that litigation is a tool, that it needs
to be used carefully.”287 Esseks offered similar sentiments, stating that, in the case of litigation
that is not filed by attorneys from the organizations, “you do what you can to engage with the
lawyers,” that are working on the case to explain to them the intricacies of a marriage test
case.288 One can also “file a friend of the court brief…and hope for the best.”289
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Cathcart argued that big national law firms should be involved in marriage equality
litigation because they are “unexpected messengers” for marriage equality, due to their
conservative history. Carthcart believes the “unexpected messenger” story is good and plays
well in the media.290 That being said, when litigation comes from outside the organizations that
have experience with marriage equality litigation, it can scare Cathcart if the attorneys have too
much naiveté about the outcome or forget about the latent prejudice toward LGB people that still
lingers in society.291 Naïve lawyers often put together plaintiff groups that are not diverse
enough for Cathcart’s liking and may expose the litigation to problems in the political sphere,
especially if, as often happens in private litigation, the public education aspect of the litigation is
neglected.292 Robinson agreed that it is a challenge to manage numerous lawsuits that come
from outside the organizations dedicated to marriage equality. She cited the unfortunate political
backlash to the 1998 case of Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics as an example of what could
happen if litigation was not part of a broader strategy.293 For Robinson, the national
organizations need to rein in over-zealous litigators, and also not pressure unwilling states – such
as the unnamed examples Cathcart cited previously – into dealing with a marriage lawsuit.294
Luckily for her, “everyone coalesced” with regard to Baker—national organizations were
supportive of the move to file, but they never pressured her or her co-counsel to do so.295
The national marriage equality organizations are cognizant of the fact that sometimes
their interference in a state will upset the LGB rights movement in that particular state.
However, they are not afraid to move ahead in a particular state if there is no consensus among
290
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all the state organizations within it. The national organizations also have had no major troubles
with donors withdrawing funding due to strategic decisions made by the organizations. The
organizations also appear to have a plan for what to do when litigation comes from outside the
few organizations that have extensive experience with that type of litigation. In such a situation,
the organizations engage with the private attorneys and seek to get involved in an advisory and
amicus role. This is the best the organizations can hope for, since they cannot block others from
filing lawsuits.
D. Windsor as the Result of a Political-Legal Strategy
Every attorney that commented on Windsor mentioned that the victory in that case argued
that such a victory was due to the political-legal “dual track” strategy that the national
organizations adopted due to their realization of the intersection of politics and the law in their
work. Murray was unequivocal—she stated Windsor was “absolutely,” a victory of the
combined political-legal strategy of the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation.296
Bonauto agreed, explaining that Windsor went from being a federalism case to a discrimination
case.297 The challenge to DOMA changed in 2009 from a challenge to the federal government
defining marriage (a task historically reserved to the states) to a challenge to the federal
government’s definition of marriage.298 In a case Bonauto brought with GLAD that was similar
and contemporaneous to Windsor, she won on the U.S. District Court level in front of an elderly
Nixon appointee, who ruled for GLAD because the federal government was “treating one group
of married people differently.”299 Bonauto credits this victory and others in the fight to strike
down DOMA to the fact that the organizations involved in that litigation got stories of married
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couples unable to enjoy the federal benefits of marriage out into the media before the litigation
started.300
Wolfson was just as emphatic as Murray, claiming that the Windsor victory was
“absolutely” due to the “dual track” advocacy he has supported in marriage equality litigation
since the early 1990s.301 Esseks agreed with Wolfson and Murray, but was slightly less emphatic
about it. “The win in Windsor couldn’t have happened without all of the progress on the
freedom to marry that preceded it,” in the courts, legislatures, at the ballot box, and the
movement of public opinion on the issue.302 Esseks also saw Windsor driving the marriage issue
in the lower federal courts today.303 Similarly, Cathcart argued that the victory in Windsor was
not necessarily due only to the political-legal strategy, but to the cases that came before.304
“Windsor is partly a result of the cases that came before, and I don’t just mean the cases that
won, or the arguments based on the Lawrence case.”305 Cathcart viewed the burst of litigation in
federal courts after Windsor as “standing on the shoulders of the Windsor case, but it didn’t start
with the Windsor case…[but with] all the things that came before.”306 To Cathcart, such legal
victories were made possible by a line of cases, both won and lost, stretching back through
Lawrence, Romer, Bowers, and beyond.
Cathcart took the broadest historical view of any attorney involved in this study, but the
consensus of all was that Windsor happened because the organizations involved in marriage
equality litigation adopted a strategy that addressed both the legal and political aspects of
marriage equality. According to the attorneys, the strategy of addressing both the political
300
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sphere and the legal arguments in relation to a piece of marriage equality litigation has already
born fruit in the victory that was the decision in U.S. v. Windsor. The next section will move on
to analyze the organizations’ strategies and actions surrounding the selection of plaintiffs for
marriage test cases. This area of the litigation campaign for marriage equality is one where the
line between that which is legal and that which is political becomes blurry when it exists at all.
This also demonstrates the influence the political aspects of the marriage cases have on their
legal aspects. As the attorneys explained, plaintiffs were political agents that also happened to
fill a legal role in lawsuits. This casts some doubt on the attorney’s previous assertion that there
is no influence of one side on the other.
E. Plaintiff Selection
The next step in the litigation campaign after laying the political groundwork for the case
is selecting plaintiffs. There are two problems inherent in this activity: actually getting the
plaintiffs, and getting the plaintiffs that will be the best for the cause. Since the organizations
involved in marriage equality litigation are acutely aware of the interaction between law and
politics, the selection of plaintiffs in many ways bridges the gap or blurs the line between that
which is political and that which is legal. The plaintiffs serve a legal purpose – without them,
there is no lawsuit – but they also serve as “ambassadors” for the whole LGB community.307
The plaintiffs in these test cases are the faces of the LGB population for many people outside of
the community. As such, they must do outreach and education, which are political activities.
This double use of plaintiffs once again shows the attorneys’ awareness of the interaction
or inseparability of law and politics and also demonstrates concrete strategies the organizations
involved in marriage equality litigation employ. Furthermore, the process of plaintiff selection is
primarily a political one. The legal role plaintiffs must play is easy, but the political roles the
307
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plaintiffs must play are time-consuming, delicate, and highly important. The attorneys in these
organizations are keenly aware of the double role the plaintiffs in test cases must play. As such,
immense amounts of energy are invested in selecting plaintiffs, and the attorneys always look for
individuals that meet certain exacting criteria.
All of this energy is expended to ensure that the ultimate goal of the marriage equality
litigation campaign is not upset in the political, or even the legal, sphere because unsavory
clients become the face of the litigation. Even in legal documents filed with courts, the plaintiffs
send political messages about the integration of LGB people in society and their similarities with
other Americans, which are political arguments aimed at drawing the court into a presented
consensus with the rest of society. This is a common issue in civil rights movements. For
example, Rosa Parks was chosen as the symbol of the Montgomery Bus Boycott because of her
wholesomeness, whereas Claudette Colvin, who was refused a seat on a Montgomery city bus
nine months before Parks, was passed over because she was an unwed teenage mother.308
Leaders of the African-American community in Montgomery thought that Colvin’s situation
“would make her an extremely vulnerable standard-bearer” for the Civil Rights Movement.309
Leaders of the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation vet their plaintiffs in the
same manner.
The first problem in finding plaintiffs, that of simply getting members of the LGB
community to serve as plaintiffs in a test case, was largely solved for Murray through the
statewide town meetings that the VCLGR held before Baker was filed. The plaintiffs for the
Vermont litigation were drawn from the VFMT Speakers’ Bureau. This Bureau was set up in
VFMT to train people to speak to the public about the issues that face the LGB population. They
308

Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998),
123.
309
Ibid.

74
were natural spokespeople for the LGB population, so they were natural selections for the
plaintiffs for the eventual lawsuit for marriage equality in Vermont.310 Robinson elaborated on
that, explaining that the call for plaintiffs for the impending litigation was transmitted orally.311
For Bonauto in the lead-up to Goodridge, the problem of finding plaintiffs was even
more swiftly dealt with because people had been coming to her seeking to file a lawsuit for
marriage equality for years before she felt she had laid the correct groundwork for a suit to go
forward.312 Bonauto also asked allies (attorneys and laypeople) across Massachusetts to get
plaintiffs from every corner of Massachusetts.313 Wolfson encountered the same situation
Bonauto did, indicating, “Sometimes the plaintiffs come to you because something horrible
happened.”314 Wolfson explained that organizations also look for compelling stories, like
couples that could not visit each other in the hospital, or who have been together for decades.315
Cathcart explained that the methods by which Lambda Legal have recruited plaintiffs for test
cases has varied from state to state. In the states wherein Lambda does not care immensely about
giving opponents to marriage equality forewarning, Lambda uses the state “Equality
Organizations” because they are usually the largest LGB groups in the state, as well as Lambda’s
mailing and membership lists.316 Lambda follows a slightly stealthier plan of action when they
do not want to give opponents any forewarning at all. In those cases, the method of obtaining
plaintiffs will be by word of mouth and through allies throughout the state in question.317
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The second problem of finding “good” plaintiffs is much harder than simply finding any
plaintiffs for a test case. As Cathcart explained, “plaintiffs…have to be better than good.”318
Speaking with some remove, Wolfson explained all impact litigation organizations look for
“powerful stories and compelling messengers” for their test cases.319 The plaintiffs are the
messengers in marriage equality cases. There is an immense amount of media focus on the
named plaintiffs in the cases, and the plaintiffs themselves are ambassadors for the entire LGB
population. As such, the plaintiffs need to have certain characteristics that not all LGB people
possess. Murray said she looked for people with specific stories to tell, especially parents and
men. All plaintiffs had to be firmly dedicated to the cause of marriage equality, too.320
According to Murray, she wanted parents because the “big bugaboo of opponents [was:] gay
people can’t get married because they can’t have kids.”321 To counter this argument, Murray
ensured that two out of the three plaintiff couples in Baker were parents raising children.322
Murray also wanted male couples for her test case in Vermont because, in her words, “there was
– there is – a very big stigma against gay men…lesbians are invisible and gay men get
tortured.”323 To counter that stigma, Murray brought Stan Baker and his partner Peter Harrigan
on board. Baker became the lead plaintiff for the test case.324
Much like Murray, Bonauto looked for plaintiffs that met specific criteria. The plaintiff
couples that Bonauto took on in her cases in Massachusetts, Connecticut and elsewhere needed
the following: to have been affected by marriage discrimination; a genuine desire to get married;
the ability to stand up to scrutiny; no skeletons in the closet; emotional stamina; and, the ability
318
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to be honest about personal issues.325 Not many people met those standards. Furthermore,
Bonauto sought to situate the plaintiff couples in the community. The selection of plaintiffs was
deliberate in the pursuit of this end. All plaintiff couples were selected to, in some way or
another, break down the perceived barriers between the LGB community and everyone else.326
Bonauto wanted people outside the LGB community to associate and sympathize with the
plaintiffs in her cases.
Cathcart, speaking for Lambda Legal, echoed the broad statement of Wolfson, and
reiterated many of the characteristics Bonauto claimed to look for in plaintiff couples. Cathcart
looked for clients that could “speak to as wide a range of people in the LGBT community and
outside the LGBT community.”327 To accomplish this goal, he and Lambda looked for the
following characteristics: compelling stories, such as long, loving relationships; couples raising
children (similar to Murray); “people who have faced concrete problems” like the inability to
visit a loved one in the hospital; racial diversity; the ability to make others see themselves or
their community as involved in the litigation; and geographical diversity.328 Cathcart explained
that geographic diversity means different things “in states the size of California, and states the
size of Rhode Island…even New Jersey versus Iowa” but that such diversity is “critically
important.”329 As examples to prove the importance of geographic diversity, Cathcart cited
Illinois and New York State. Both such states have massive metropolises that dominate the
politics of their states (Chicago in Illinois and New York City in New York), and often breed
resentment either “up-state” or “down-state” in New York and Illinois, respectively.330 Thus, to
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avoid the appearance that a group of big-city LGB people was imposing its views on the rest of
the state, Lambda worked to get plaintiffs from across both states when it brought litigation in
Illinois and New York.331 Finally, when selecting clients, Lambda made sure that there was no
history of domestic violence, nor were there criminal records, or any other sorts of “white noise”
associated with any of the plaintiffs.332 These sorts of things, according to Cathcart, would keep
people from focusing on the discrimination that the plaintiff couples were fighting against.333
Esseks and the ACLU do many of the same things that Cathcart at Lambda and Bonauto
at GLAD do. Esseks had some clients just walk through the door, just like Bonauto and
Cathcart. Edith Windsor of U.S. v. Windsor fame was one such client.334 However, the ACLU
also interviewed potential clients, looking for plaintiffs that would do the best job of
demonstrating the harm inflicted by denying marriage to same-sex couples.335 The ACLU also
looked for qualities that would make the plaintiffs relatable, such as long relationships and
couples that had sacrificed for each other.336 All of these qualities kept people focused on the
discrimination at issue in the litigation.
Every attorney interviewed for this study agreed that the plaintiffs in marriage litigation
had to be “better than good” because they had to serve a political role as “ambassadors” for their
cause. To avoid clients who may be viewed as unsavory by those either inside or outside of the
LGB community, attorneys in the organizations bringing marriage equality lawsuits impose high
standards on those who wish to bring marriage equality litigation. As mentioned earlier, not
many people meet the criteria set by the organizations for plaintiffs in marriage test cases. Not
331
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many people have what it takes to be a plaintiff in such a high stakes case. As Cathcart put it,
choosing nearly perfect plaintiffs allows for the focus of the lawsuit to be on the discrimination
they have faced, and not on distracting “white noise” such as domestic issues.337
The careful selection of plaintiffs in marriage equality cases has not gone unnoticed.
Some people outside of the organizations involved in the marriage equality litigation campaign
have asked whether such selection to produce such an atypical plaintiff pool makes for good test
cases, since the plaintiffs are not representative of most people. One such person was Judge
Downing of the Washington State Superior Court.338 In Andersen v. King County, which
eventually reached the Washington State Supreme Court, Judge Downing observed
Certainly these plaintiffs have been carefully handpicked to serve as suitable standard bearers for the
cause of same-sex marriage. Their lives reflect hard work, professional achievement, religious faith
and a willingness to stand up for their beliefs. They are law-abiding, taxpaying model citizens.339

Despite their exemplarity, Judge Downing worried “if it clouds the Court's view to decide a test
case with a view to parties who may rise above the median in so many respects.”340 Judge
Downing decided the answer to his own question was no.
While recognizing the imperfection of human nature, it is still beneficial to contemplate what we all
should be rather than what we, too often, are. The delineation of rights is best done with a view to
human potentialities rather than in fear of our shortcomings. The characteristics embodied by these
plaintiffs are ones that our society and the institution of marriage need more of, not less. Let the
plaintiffs stand as inspirations for all those citizens, homosexual and heterosexual, who may follow
their path.341

As the decision of Judge Downing shows, marriage equality advocates accomplished
their political goal with its plaintiff selection in Andersen. The judge was highly aware that the
lawyers had “carefully handpicked…suitable standard bearers” for the cause of marriage equality
in Washington state and found that such an atypical group of individuals was actually quite
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suitable for a marriage equality test case. There was no “white noise” in Andersen, just plaintiffs
that Cathcart would describe as “better than good.” While it is beyond the scope of this study to
determine if or how much the lives of the plaintiffs swayed Judge Downing, it is clear that the
judge thought highly of the plaintiffs before him, enough to comment extensively on them. This
demonstrates the political nature of the role of plaintiffs in a marriage test case. Any same-sex
couple could be plaintiffs to marriage litigation, but only atypical couples would lead a judge to
wax so poetically in a decision.
In the final analysis, the selection of plaintiffs, while undertaken to fill a legal position in
a lawsuit, is inherently a political process. The selection of plaintiffs is done to appeal to as
broad an array of people as possible. This is not fine-tuned legal argument; this is argument by
example and is political in nature since it attempts to build popular consensus around marriage
equality. The following section will expand the analysis of the marriage equality litigation
campaign into another subject that blurs the line between legal and political: the marshalling of
amici curiae.
F. Marshalling Amici Curiae
The lawyers in the organizations involved marriage equality litigation do have an
understanding that marriage equality cases have legal and political aspects that must be
addressed if the movement is to make advances. Perhaps in acknowledgement of the political
nature of marriage cases, organizations have taken special care of one of the most political
aspects of arguing a lawsuit, the amicus curiae briefs. Just as in the political action of selecting
good plaintiffs, organizations invest tremendous energy into acquiring amici curiae that will
sway courts with political statements as well as legal arguments. Every attorney in this study
indicated that the amicus briefs are of great import in the cases, not only for what they say, but
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also for who writes them. Sometimes the biggest political statement an amicus organization can
make is placing its name on a brief, signaling to the court that the organization supports marriage
equality. As with carefully selected plaintiffs, amici curiae are in a legal position in a lawsuit,
but their activity in marriage equality cases is almost wholly political.
Although numerous amici weighed in during the Baehr litigation, the first major amicus
campaign marriage equality advocates undertook was in Vermont during the Baker litigation.
Murray explained that the amicus briefs in Baker served multiple purposes. Amicus briefs
needed to bring arguments that could not be given much room in the principal briefs of the case.
The overall strategy was to let the principal briefs focus on the legal arguments, while the amicus
briefs were for arguments that the Baker counsel though might sway the court or a single justice,
but were not worthy of full mention in the principal brief.342 Arguments about applying higher
standards of review to classifications based on sexual orientation were left to the amicus briefs of
major national organizations in the LGB rights movement, and not the principle brief.343
Robinson expanded upon this point, explaining that Lambda Legal argued that
prohibiting marriage equality constituted sexual orientation discrimination in their amicus
brief.344 The National Organization for Women and the National Center for Lesbian Rights then
argued in their briefs that prohibiting marriage equality constituted sex discrimination.345
Wolfson agreed with Murray and Robinson, stating that the amicus briefs were for “arguments
that you don’t have space to make, or that someone else has a stronger voice or greater expertise
to make that will round out the core set of arguments.”346 The key to a successful amici
campaign, according to Wolfson, was finding who will “resonate with the court, even if the
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content of what they’re saying isn’t very different,” from what the lawyers or other amici
argue.347 An amicus that resonates with the court might be a powerful business group or other
organization that has considerable sway outside of the courtroom that the court would be aware
of. In some ways, the messenger to the court is more important than the message itself.
The amicus briefs also needed to bring various voices to the court that the marriage
equality advocates wanted the court to hear. Thus, the Baker attorneys focused on getting a brief
from clergy in Vermont to rebut the argument that marriage equality “goes against God’s
law.”348 Murray and her co-counsel also arranged for a brief from psychologists to address “the
kid issue” and rebut the argument “that kids are going to be screwed up if they get raised by gay
people.”349 In this way, the attorneys in Baker addressed concerns that were political, not legal,
in that they did not deal with standards of judicial scrutiny or legal rules.
When conducting her own amici campaigns, Bonauto focused on getting “genuine
experts…with no ax to grind” to address the court.350 For example, in Goodridge, Bonauto
managed to have the two best-known family law attorneys in Massachusetts compose a brief
debunking the argument that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry because they
could not procreate.351 Not only were the attorneys well known and widely acknowledged as the
foremost experts in Massachusetts’s family law, but also “not in any way could anyone accuse
them of being great gay rights supporters.”352 Bonauto also looked for the unusual voices that
the court might be surprised to hear in support of marriage equality. The best example of this
was in the Windsor litigation when Bonauto and others arranged to have 286 of the Fortune 500
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companies sign on to a brief explaining how DOMA was bad for business.353 The businesses
added a new voice, one the court was not expecting, and also served as a symbol of how much
public perception had changed to be in favor of marriage equality. Once again, the messengers
to the court were just as important as the message they bore.
Bonauto’s prominence and skill at conducting amici campaigns is such that, when asked
how to make a good amici campaign, Esseks replied, “you talk to Mary Bonauto.”354 Esseks
went on to elaborate on what he and the ACLU sought in amicus briefs for marriage cases.
Esseks looks for “religious voices, business voices, conservative voices, [and] unexpected
messengers.”355 Esseks particularly likes utilizing unexpected messengers because they ensure
that the briefs will actually be read in cases were there are numerous lengthy briefs.356
Similarly, Cathcart explained that he and Lambda look for “as broad a coalition of voices
as possible,” in the amicus briefs.357 Thus, he looks for political leaders, religious leaders, civil
rights organizations and organizations with good name recognition.358 Just as important as the
actual argument of the brief and the organization signing off on it is the law firm that assists in
the composition of the brief. Cathcart noted that there has been a massive shift in recent years,
with more and more major national law firms assisting in the composition of amicus briefs for
marriage cases.359 This is especially interesting to Cathcart because it used to be that one could
not be gay and work for a major law firm because they were so conservative.360 To Cathcart, the
fact that major firms actively assist with amicus briefs in marriage cases, even though they make
little money on them and might jeopardize client relations, is a sign of changes in society that
353

Ibid.
Esseks interview.
355
Ibid.
356
Ibid.
357
Cathcart interview.
358
Ibid.
359
Ibid.
360
Ibid.
354

83
have already occurred that favor the adoption of marriage equality.361 This is especially helpful,
because the major firms are “a world the judges know,” and they will realize that the legal
establishment is on the side of marriage equality when at one point it was quite conservative on
that issue.362 Thus, to Cathcart, even “the messenger for the messenger” is important in amicus
briefs.363
All the attorneys interviewed for this study recognize the importance of good amici
curiae, and thus seeks out amici that will sway courts. The manner by which good amici sway
courts is not merely through legal arguments. The presence of major national law firms on the
briefs signals to courts that the national legal establishment is in favor of marriage equality.
Briefs from clergy, psychologists, and family law specialists also put the lie to common
stereotypes and arguments against marriage equality. Business and conservative voices in briefs
will also alert judges to the fact that marriage equality is not a fringe or partisan issue, but a
mainstream one that affects many segments of the population. These arguments, in contrast to
the legal arguments offered by amici like the ACLU and NCLR, are inherently political
arguments. In selecting and courting amici, the attorneys in the organizations pursuing marriage
equality litigation demonstrate their understanding of the intersection of the law and politics.
The next section will analyze how far that understanding goes toward an acceptance of the
scholarly literature’s backlash hypothesis.
G. Backlash
As mentioned previously in the literature review, a great controversy in the scholarly
literature on the marriage equality litigation campaign is over the presence of “backlash.” This
backlash hypothesis presupposes an intersection of the law and politics, which the attorneys in
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this study accept as well. However, those attorneys are not completely willing to take the next
analytical step and refer to the political resistance it faces due to legal victories as “backlash.”
When the attorneys interviewed in this study brought their test cases to court, they were all aware
of the possibility of resistance, but not all of them actually referred to that resistance as backlash.
In fact, a couple argued that the term “backlash” is not even the correct term to use in the context
of marriage equality litigation. Nonetheless, the attorneys were aware of the potential for
adverse reactions after a favorable court decision came down. This shows the attorneys in the
organizations responsible for much marriage equality litigation have internalized key provisions
of the backlash hypothesis, even if attorneys do not use the word “backlash.” While a couple of
attorneys refused to refer to the resistance they met after favorable judicial decisions as
“backlash,” they did mention that they were aware of negative political ramifications after such a
decision. This affected the political decisions to fill the legal positions of plaintiffs and amici
curiae in marriage equality litigation.
Murray defined backlash nationally and locally. According to her experience in Baker,
the local backlash in Vermont was felt in 2000 was “entirely political, in that some legislators
who had voted for civil unions…were voted out.”364 The Democrats, who had almost uniformly
supported the civil unions law, lost control of the House of Representatives and almost lost the
Senate. Murray thought that the backlash was completely unnecessary, because the decision in
Baker, in her view, unnecessarily forced the legislature to enact a law to remedy the denial of
marriage benefits to same-sex couples. She would have preferred that the Baker court simply
imposed marriage on the state. In fact, she and Robinson had premised their entire strategy on
the legislature never getting involved.365 Interestingly, Murray expressed the opinion that a more
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radical decision simply imposing marriage equality on the state by judicial fiat would have
caused less severe backlash than the more cautious decision in Baker that forced the legislature
to act. Another unexpected feature of local backlash to Murray was that the debate over
marriage equality allowed people to express homophobia in ways that they had not felt free to do
so before. Murray cited people going on the radio and putting lawn signs out in opposition to
marriage equality and civil unions as examples of this emergence of homophobia.366 Nationally,
Murray defined backlash as “one hell of a lot of statutes and constitutional amendments,” in over
thirty states banning marriage equality.367
Robinson defined backlash as the idea that a win in court is subject to a potentially
adverse public reaction. She argued that the fact that one must account for this adverse public
reaction “up front” to avoid negative repercussions of a legal victory later makes marriage
equality litigation different from other types of litigation.368 Esseks agreed with Robinson,
defining backlash as “political fallout, political consequences to advances in litigation,” but also
had nothing good to say about the backlash-hypothesizer critiques of the marriage equality
litigation campaign.369 To him, such critiques assumed too much compartmentalization of law
and politics by the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation and tunnel vision on the
part of the litigators that is simply not true in the litigation campaign. Cathcart reverted to the
shorthand of marriage equality advocates to explain what backlash meant to him, referring
simply to “Hawaii and Iowa.”370 He also explained that the right-wing legal groups, such as the
Thomas Moore Center, were sources of backlash. Although he expressed hope for the future,
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and explained that, as of 2014, backlash has become substantially “watered down,” Cathcart did
not at any time suggest that backlash would end within the foreseeable future.371
Bonauto and Wolfson, on the other hand, do not believe that the term “backlash” is
correct when applied to the events surrounding the marriage equality litigation campaign, but
they do acknowledge the resistance the marriage equality advocates have faced in response to
their victories in court. Bonauto has repeatedly explained why she is opposed to the term
“backlash,” as applied to the resistance the she has faced after winning victories in court, usually
quoting the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who said that the Civil Rights Movement did
not experience backlash, but did experience “lashing.”372 According to Bonauto, the LGB
population has experienced similar lashing. There was no real backlash against marriage
equality, just a “continued lash” beginning before the advocates of marriage equality won any
concrete victories.373 One of the things Bonauto reminds others is that, before Goodridge was
even filed, there were thirty-six states with statutory prohibitions of same-sex marriage and four
that had amendments. “Before there was marriage anywhere in the nation, there were still plenty
of legislative leaders” who preemptively opposed marriage equality and who “used the initiative
process as a tool against gay people.” According to Bonauto, LGB people have “had plenty of
lash.”374 Bonauto also disagrees with some political scientists – such as Gerald Rosenberg and
Michael Klarman, mentioned in the literature review section of this thesis – who argue that the
Democratic Party lost the 2004 elections, particularly in Ohio due to the marriage issues being on
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the ballot and in the public mind due to Goodridge.375 Bonauto agrees with Thomas Keck and
others that the backlash hypothesis is far overblown, especially with regard to Ohio in 2004.376
Wolfson similarly cites the Rev. Dr. King in his writings and interviews. Wolfson’s 2004
book Why Marriage Matters cites the same speech that Bonauto cites when she explains that the
LGB population has not suffered from backlash, but has suffered from lashing. King spoke of
the supposed “white backlash” to the African-American civil rights movement’s successes.377
However, King argued that there was no backlash,
Because that gives the impression that the nation had decided it was going to solve this problem and
then there was a step back because of developments in the civil rights movement. Now, the fact is that
America has been backlashing on the civil rights question for centuries now…the backlash is merely
the surfacing of prejudices…that already existed and they are just now starting to open.378

Wolfson believes that the campaign for marriage equality has suffered from the same surfacing
of extant prejudices, instead of the nation agreeing to grant marriage equality and then
collectively reversing that decision. Instead, Wolfson views the resistance to marriage equality
litigation victories as simply a manifestation of a “struggle over two competing visions of
America’s meaning, principles of equality under the law, and so on.”379 This is similar to
Murray’s description of what she referred to as backlash in Vermont after Baker. After the
decision of Baker was handed down and the legislature began seriously debating provisions to
carrying out its mandate, latent homophobia bubbled up across the state.
Whether or not the attorneys involved in marriage equality litigation referred to the
resistance they faced due to court victories as “backlash” or bought into the backlash hypothesis,
every attorney understood that resistance existed. Every attorney involved in this study
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explained that resistance to legal victories was in his or her mind as every case was litigated.
Murray explained that backlash was in her mind when Baker was pending, and that she and
VFMT did everything they could to prevent debilitating backlash by continuing the educational
process.380 However, she did stress that since she, Robinson, and Bonauto were all lawyers they
had faith in the judiciary’s power to “protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority.”381
Murray did point out that other members of the LGB community were much more frightened of
backlash or political repercussions. One such community member Murray named was Bill
Lippert, an openly gay Democratic member of the Vermont House of Representative from
Hinesburg, Vermont. Lippert was worried not only that he might lose his seat, but also that the
Democratic Party might lose spectacularly because of its association with the marriage equality
struggle.382 Lippert was also worried for his own personal safety; Murray reported that he
received death threats due to his association with the civil unions law and his open
homosexuality.383 Despite this, Murray insisted that the lawyers were not, and could not have
been, paralyzed by their fear of negative repercussions or resistance.
Robinson, Murray’s co-counselor and a fellow Vermonter, explained that one must
always expect some sort of adverse reaction to victory in marriage equality cases, but that the
intensity of such a reaction was a local question.384 According to Robinson, marriage equality
cases “are not in a place yet where they can escape public notice.”385 The question for Robinson
is whether or not the public attention will bring debilitating negative repercussions, the way it
was in Vermont in 2000 when the Democrats lost the Vermont House of Representatives.386 In
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2009, when Robinson shepherded the Vermont marriage equality legislation through the state
legislature, the bill passed, same-sex couples got truly married, and no real adverse reaction
occurred. Robinson attributes this to the fact that in 2009 the opponents of marriage equality
were weak in influence, disorganized, and few in number.387 This nicely echoes Klarman’s
assertion that backlash only comes when losers in court cases are “committed, organized and
geographically concentrated.”388
Bonauto unequivocally stated she expected resistance in all of the marriage equality cases
she worked on. In fact, Bonauto even put the DOMA litigation she was pursuing on hold for the
2008 election cycle so that the Democratic Party would not be put into a tough place and
potentially lose votes because of the divisive issue of marriage.389 While Bonauto may disagree
with some scholars (e.g. Rosenberg) that negative feelings toward marriage equality among
voters in swing states cost the Democrats the 2004 elections, she acted as if she did agree with
such scholarship. This shows the internalization of the backlash hypothesis, even if attorneys do
not refer to the negative repercussions of legal victories as “backlash” the way Klarman and
Rosenberg do. Bonauto also put her DOMA litigation on hold until many years after
Massachusetts allowed same-sex couples to wed in 2004. Although section 3 of DOMA harmed
same-sex couples in Massachusetts “because the federal government was telling these married
people that they were not married,” Bonauto waited five years to file a lawsuit “for really good
reasons…we wanted the harm to build up.”390 That way, all the legal and factual arguments
would be in the marriage equality advocates’ favor.
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Cathcart also stated that one has to be prepared in every marriage case for resistance to
any advances the litigation campaign may make in court.391 The history of the struggle for
marriage equality has been one of intense struggle to win in court and hold on to that victory in
the political sphere beyond the courtroom. According to Cathcart, though, that has changed in
the past few years. “Over the twenty-some-year period in which this work has been done…there
have been enormous changes. Just look at the polling data from the early ‘90s to last year.”392
Now Cathcart and Lambda Legal actually struggle with the question, “what do you do with cases
that no one is defending?”393 As an example, Cathcart cited the state of Nevada’s withdrawal
from a marriage equality case in which it had defended the Nevada constitutional amendment
that banned marriage equality. The state had been forced to withdraw its defense because the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the precedents of which bind Nevada courts, decided that
classifications based on sexual orientation must be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny in
Smithkline Beecham Corporation v. Abbot Laboratories.394 Cathcart explained that this recent
switch in public support and the states’ withdrawal from defense of statutes and constitutional
amendments is a problem, but “we’ve spent the last decades not even being able to dream of
having that problem.”395
Esseks agreed with Cathcart and Bonauto that backlash must be expected in every
marriage equality case, but he argued that the dip in public support that usually follows marriage
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equality victories in court “tends to turn around” once one takes a longer view of time.396
Wolfson also agreed that resistance must be expected, and that the work of blunting the ferocity
of that resistance “is not done simply by filing a brief or getting a ruling.”397 However, he did
allude to the fact that this understanding was not shared by all lawyers and plaintiffs involved in
marriage equality litigation, perhaps referring to the private attorneys and individual plaintiffs
outside of the national marriage equality organizations who still file cases in favor of marriage
equality.398
As Cathcart mentioned, there has been a massive shift in public opinion that has resulted
in decreased vigor for defense of statutes and constitutional amendments banning marriage
equality. However, every attorney involved in this study explained that the United States as a
whole has not reached the end of resistance to the victories of marriage equality advocates in
court. Every attorney explained that marriage equality cases must still be filed with the
expectation of resistance outside the courtroom, even if marriage equality advocates secure a
victory in court.
H. Backlash Due to Prematurity: Was Marriage Foisted on the LGB Rights Movement?
The following section analyzes a different resistance issue: whether the resistance
marriage equality advocates suffered was due to the fact that the marriage issue was imposed on
the broader LGB rights movement. If such imposition actually occurred, it may explain the
debilitating early resistance the litigation campaign faced because the LGB rights organizations
had been unable to do the requisite preparatory political groundwork.
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According to some scholars, the marriage issue arrived rather suddenly in the LGB rights
movement and was not welcomed by all.399 The same scholars argue that the broader movement
changed because of the rise of the marriage equality litigation campaign within the broader LGB
rights movement. D’Emilio notes the suddenness of marriage’s arrival on the national stage with
the decision in Baehr, a decision the United States at large was wholly unprepared for.400
D’Emilio also points out that the organizations in the LGB rights movement themselves was not
wholly supportive of marriage. Two LGB rights advocates, Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard,
toured the nation in the 1980s and 1990s for Lambda Legal, publically debating the merits of
marriage as a goal for the LGB rights movement, with Ettelbrick arguing against it and Stoddard
arguing for it.401 This was a real debate in the LGB rights movement, since many members of
the movement organizations agreed with Ettelbrick and believed they should create their own
types of relationships. Other issues, such as AIDS research, bullying of LGB children, and
employment discrimination were seen by many as more pressing issues for LGB people than
marriage. According to D’Emilio, many factors, such as the New Right’s emphasis on family
values and the aging of the Stonewall Generation, according to D’Emilio, led to marriage
becoming the prominent issue of the LGB rights movement.402
Pinello’s study of the marriage equality campaign of the early 2000s quotes Evan
Wolfson to explain how the LGB rights movement changed due to the advent of marriage as an
issue after Baehr. According to Wolfson, the entire organizational structure of the LGB rights
movement changed to lay the groundwork for marriage equality litigation.403 The “Equality
Federation of statewide groups” was formed to bring all LGB rights groups into the same
399
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strategy and to keep them all informed.404 The movement organizations also shifted toward
seeing things in terms of “the cause” and not “one case, or one battle or one issue.”405 According
to Wolfson, this thinking and organization was completely new for the LGB rights movement
and happened because of the Baehr litigation and the lessons learned from its aftermath.406
Unsurprisingly, all the attorneys interviewed in this study indicated that the marriage
issue was ripe for litigation when it arose in the 1990s, and that it was neither imposed upon, nor
did it substantively change the strategies of, the broader LGB rights movement. In Vermont,
according to Murray and Robinson, the next legal step for LGB Vermonters was marriage by the
mid 1990s. Murray listed three crucial steps that led to marriage being ready for litigation and
acceptance in Vermont. First, in 1989, Vermont’s legislature enacted a hate crimes statute that
listed sexual orientation and gender identity as protected characteristics, along with more
traditional protected categories such as race.407 Second, in 1992, a new anti-discrimination law
went into effect that protected LGB people. Third, in 1993, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled
that same-sex couples could adopt each other’s children.408 This is similar to the incrementalist
approach that Eskridge advocated for in the early 2000s.409 Regardless of the empirical validity
of Eskridge’s theory now, at the time Murray was preparing for a test case for marriage in
Vermont in the 1990s, the legal climate was ready, so that marriage was in no way foisted on the
LGB rights movement. In fact, Murray argued, “We went after it.”410 Robinson agreed that the
time was right for Vermont’s test case. However, she did explain that she, Murray, and Bonauto
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were acutely aware that they could not “jump in too soon,” but that they could not be too late,
either.411
Bonauto agreed that the time was right for the test case in Vermont, especially because of
the strong protections that the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont state constitution gave to
minorities.412 The Common Benefits Clause arguments carried the day in Baker v. State of
Vermont.413 She also mentioned that people had come to GLAD from the beginning of her time
there.414 Bonauto even directly rebutted the assertion in “the academic literature” that the
organizations that brought marriage equality litigation made an issue of marriage when most
people did not want it. She argued that they “weren’t the ones taking the phone calls” and that
many LGB people were angry with her for not being even more aggressive on marriage at an
earlier time.415
Wolfson echoed Bonauto, arguing that some activists perceived the marriage issue was
foisted on the broader LGB rights movement because they were not focused on marriage when it
resurfaced as a major issue in the 1990s. According to Wolfson, most of the activist elite in the
LGB rights movement moved away from marriage after the universal failure of the first wave of
marriage cases.416 However, he was quick to point out that a mere two years after the Stonewall
Riots of 1969, which are now thought of as the beginning of the modern LGB rights movement,
marriage equality was before the United States Supreme Court.417 To Wolfson, marriage was not
a new issue at all, but one that is as old as the modern LGB rights movement itself.
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Cathcart agreed with all the other attorneys, but also pointed out that the era in which
marriage reemerged as a major issue was a massively different one from the current one due to
the difference in the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s versus today.418 Twenty-five years
ago, AIDS killed thousands of LGB people and weakened the LGB rights movement
tremendously.419 In that climate, people were dying, and their relationships were unrecognized
by the state. The AIDS epidemic also drove people to fight for marriage because marriage
offered a reprieve from the grisly battles the LGB community fought for AIDS research and
other life-or-death matters. According to Cathcart, marriage was attractive to LGB people of that
time because it meant they could fight for “something that was happy, not sad,” and that fighting
for marriage equality was seen as something “that wasn’t fighting against something bad, it was
fighting for something they’d been denied.”420 Cathcart also scoffed at the idea that the marriage
issue was imposed on the LGB rights movement, wondering how anything could actually be
“imposed” on the broader movement.421 Thus, as marriage equality activists lay the groundwork
for a test case in Vermont in the 1990s, and even in Massachusetts later in that decade, the
marriage equality activists were ready for the fight that would come.
Esseks was even more adamant that the marriage issue was not foisted upon the broader
LGB rights movement. He pointed out that the ACLU brought the first marriage equality case in
1970.422 Like Wolfson, Esseks referred to Baker v. Nelson, which even reached the United
States Supreme Court. For Esseks, the reemergence of the marriage issue in the 1990s was the
result of two forces – one within the LGB rights movement, and one without. Internally, the
LGB rights movement at that time had many people who were enthusiastic about marriage and
418
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wanted it. Of course, there were those who did not want marriage to be a goal for the LGB rights
movement, or perhaps wanted it to be a secondary goal.423 The pro-marriage voices represented
by Stoddard eventually became the most noticeable in the LGB rights movement. External to the
LGB rights movement, its opponents flew to the issue of marriage equality because they thought
that it would be an issue they could win on.424 Politically speaking, they were quite right about
this. Esseks went so far as to say:
If we had all collectively stopped, and filed no more briefs, and made no more legal arguments and
filed any other marriage litigation, the public discussion would have been focused on marriage
anyways, not because it was driven by LGBT rights advocates, but because that’s where our opponents
wanted the conversation to go.425

To Esseks, any “imposition” of marriage on the broader LGB rights movement may have
partially been due to a strategic choice made by conservative groups, but the LGB movement
was ready to move on to marriage when it became an issue in the 1990s.426
Given their positions in, and proximity to, the organizations responsible for much
marriage equality litigation, it is completely unsurprising that not a single attorney in this study
expressed the belief that the marriage issue was foisted upon an unwilling LGB rights
movement, or that the machinations of external groups and individuals brought marriage to the
fore without the LGB movement doing anything. According to the attorneys, the LGB
movement organizations were ready to fight for marriage when marriage became a national issue
in the 1990s. They believe that in some places, such as Vermont, the legal and political
groundwork had actually been laid before marriage became an issue. In their view, contrary to
some scholarly critiques, activists in the broader LGB rights movement did not rush headlong
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into marriage. A better observation would be that advocates for marriage equality did not grasp
the intersection of the law and politics in their work to a sufficient extent before losing politically
after several early cases.
I. The End of Backlash?
The issue of marriage equality now inhabits a different world than when it was seriously
litigated in the 1990s. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has been repealed;427 a majority of Americans
support marriage equality;428 President Obama and Vice President Biden have repeatedly
publically voiced support for marriage equality;429 marriage equality advocates have won
numerous cases in court; and, several referenda have enacted marriage equality. Looking at
these facts, one may be led to believe that the United States has reached the end of backlash. Not
a single attorney interviewed in this study believed that such a historical moment has come to
pass.
Murray explained that it may seem like the end of backlash has come, but once one
travels outside of the Northeast and the few other states that allow marriage equality by law, the
resistance to marriage equality is still a reality.430 After all, Windsor only struck down section 3
of DOMA, not section 2, which allows states to not recognize same-sex couples’ marriages if
they were performed in another state. Murray also employed an analogy that other attorneys
used as well—that of the campaign to strike down anti-miscegenation laws in the mid-twentieth
century. According to Murray, the California Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation
laws first, but it took nineteen years for the United States Supreme Court to follow suit in Loving
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v. Virginia.431 Murray predicts that, since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court mandated
marriage in 2004, by or before the year 2023 the United States Supreme Court will hand down a
decision affirmatively in favor of marriage equality.432
Robinson echoed Murray, arguing a state-by-state analysis is crucial, because she
believes one cannot treat the nation as a homogenous whole on this issue.433 Wolfson argued,
“we have come to a turning point, and victory is within reach and will happen, provided we stick
with the work, but it won’t just waft in by itself or on a wave of inevitability.”434 That work
includes the public outreach and education programs that accompany the litigation for marriage
equality.
While Murray, Robinson, and Wolfson did not in any way indicate that backlash or
resistance to marriage equality victories was finished, they were much more hopeful than
Bonauto, Cathcart, and Esseks. Bonauto argued, “if it were possible still to criminalize a
relationship between same-sex couples, some states would do it, but it’s not possible because of
Lawrence v. Texas.”435 She also pointed out that many states that do not have marriage equality
either by legislation or judicial fiat have constitutional amendments banning marriage equality.
“Changing the fundamental charter of your government to forbid any recognition of any
relationship that approximates a marriage” is the ultimate insult for Bonauto, and a sign that such
states will not go along willingly with court decisions mandating marriage equality.436 Esseks
insists that the nation is “not even close” to the end of backlash, but he argues on different
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grounds.437 To Esseks, the fight is now no longer over constitutional amendments banning
marriage equality, but rather over “religious freedom restoration acts” that permit private
discrimination against same-sex couples if such discrimination conforms to an individual’s
religious belief.438
Cathcart agreed with Bonauto and Esseks, indicating that the legislature of the state of
Indiana was debating the passage of a constitutional amendment banning recognition of samesex couples’ marriages.439 To Cathcart, when a legislature is still debating such an amendment,
one cannot talk of the end of backlash.440 However, Cathcart does believe, like Murray does,
that the United States Supreme Court will issue a decision affirmatively calling for marriage
equality in all states. The only difference between the two lawyers is that Cathcart believes such
a decision will come soon—“in the next couple of years.”441 Even if such a decision comes to
pass, Cathcart believes that the resistance to it would be widespread. As an analogy, Cathcart
pointed out that Varnum decided and settled the issue of marriage equality in Iowa, and has
withstood the test of time despite backlash via the judicial retention elections, but that Lambda
still has to bring cases to enforce its mandate.442 In 2013, Lambda brought two cases to the Iowa
Supreme Court on behalf of two lesbian couples. One couple wanted both of their names on the
death certificate of a child as parents thereof, the other couples wanted both of their names on a
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birth certificate as parents.443 Despite Varnum, state agencies refused to do so, although the Iowa
Supreme Court eventually ordered them to comply with Varnum’s mandate.444 Thus, Cathcart
foresees massive resistance, especially in the South, to a Supreme Court decision mandating
marriage equality.
With still just a bare majority of Americans in support of marriage equality and continued
resistance to judicial rulings in favor of marriage equality, the attorneys involved in marriage
equality litigation interviewed for this study do not believe the end of backlash has come. These
attorneys do not even believe that the apex of backlash has passed, merely that backlash of the
future will be different, such as “religious freedom restoration acts.”
J. The Effect of Losses in Litigation and the Legislature
Although most of the literature on the marriage equality litigation campaign has focused
on the political resistance or backlash that follows victories in court, there is little research on the
effects of litigation losses or of national organizations’ opinion of litigation losses.445 This
flipside of the backlash hypothesis – which assumes marriage equality advocates win in court –
remains unexplored. By and large, the attorneys involved in this study argued that litigation
defeats actually aided the push for marriage equality, despite the temporary setback. This
demonstrates a dramatic departure from the internalization of the backlash hypothesis mentioned
previously. The attorneys mostly insisted that in the event of legal defeats the political side of
the organizations’ work was not harmed, and may have even been helped by that defeat. Murray
was the exception to this general rule. Murray believes that litigation defeats are irretrievably
bad. “It seems obvious to” Murray that defeats in court would be setbacks for the cause of
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marriage equality.446 One attorney involved with marriage equality litigation expressed the
belief that Baker was not a victory because it did not bring about full marriage equality.
However, the attorney did note that Baker wound up being beneficial in the end because it did
not derail the progression to marriage in Vermont.447
Cathcart explained that, although the line of causality is not perfectly clear, the litigation
losses in New York448 and Washington449 states helped. “The public education value…of
lawsuits that lost” was vast because it opened up space for further public discussion.450 This
would have been harder without “the blaze of publicity surrounding the lawsuits, sometimes
even including the loss.”451 Additionally, litigation losses get “earned media” for the marriage
equality campaign, which is how Cathcart sees national and regional organizations getting their
message out most effectively.452 Wolfson also cited the Hernandez loss in New York State as a
loss for the marriage equality litigation campaign that wound up actually helping the cause of
marriage equality in the long run because of the publicity it received, leading to the legislature
passing a marriage equality law.453 Wolfson also saw the massive loss in Bowers as another such
eventually beneficial loss for the LGB rights movement as a whole and the marriage equality
litigation campaign within it. According to Wolfson, Bowers “renewed commitment in fighting
for the freedom to marry.”454
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Esseks agreed with Wolfson and Cathcart, but went even further, arguing that “every
single one” of marriage equality advocates’ defeats advance the cause of marriage equality in the
long run.455 According to Esseks, “we’re trying to get the country’s attention [and] talk to them
about why these people want to get married, [so] each of the pieces of litigation has started a
conversation.”456 These cases, even the losses, allowed the cause of marriage equality to move
forward. For example, in the slew of marriage cases filed in New York, Oregon, Washington,
Maryland, Connecticut, and California in 2004, the advocates of marriage equality lost all but the
California and Connecticut cases.457 However, all of those losses helped achieve the political
victories in New York, Maryland and Washington.458
Many of the attorneys involved in this study also largely held the belief that even
legislative defeats can help advance the cause of marriage equality. On the other hand, Cathcart
was adamant that political defeats simply forced people to work harder.459 To Cathcart, “some
of the [defeats suffered in] lawsuits led to the possibility for legislative action,” but the same
could not be said for defeats suffered in states’ legislatures. Esseks gave a mild example of a
legislative defeat that ended up assisting the cause of marriage equality in the long run: the New
York State Assembly’s failure to pass a marriage equality bill in 2009.460 While Esseks believes
that the marriage equality could have come about in the legislature without that loss, it did allow
for the creation of a “plan of action” for several organizations’ successful push for marriage
equality in 2011.461
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In contrast to Cathcart and Esseks, Wolfson and Bonauto both cited the losses in
California in 2008 and Maine in 2009 as examples of political losses that galvanized the
organizations and individuals and brought about progress despite the initial setback they created.
To Bonauto, “Prop 8, ironically, turned out to be extremely helpful.”462 The Proposition 8
campaign, “put on display for the nation the kinds of attacks we’ve been experiencing…it was an
eye opener for many” in that it revealed homophobia in all of its ugliness.463 Furthermore,
“there’s nothing like having something taken away to be a motivator, and so people in California
were…politicized by this.”464 Then, before Maine voters went to the ballot in 2009,
organizations dedicated to marriage equality raised a lot of money from small online donations
from people who “didn’t want another Prop 8 to happen.”465 When Mainers took away the right
marry from same-sex couples later in 2009, people were once against radicalized and energized,
which helped the cause of marriage equality in the long run, even though the Proposition 8
campaign and the Maine defeat caused so much damage.466 Wolfson saw the loss on Proposition
8 as
Shocking the conscience of a lot of non-gay people and awakening a lot of people out of their
complacency and sense that we were just going to drift to victory, and spurred the invention of
Freedom to Marriage into the robust campaign that we have been since 2010 to win the freedom to
marry, having been more of an internal movement strategy center.467

Wolfson also explained that, after the loss in the first Maine battle, activists spent months
knocking on doors and reframing political arguments.468 That effort and retooling, in Wolfson’s
mind, won the second Maine referendum in 2011.
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According to some of the lawyers interviewed in this study, losses in court can actually
advance the cause of marriage equality in the long run by bringing media attention to the issue of
marriage discrimination and energizing LGB people and their allies to work harder. Although
the lawyers disagreed over whether political losses can have the same effect, some argued that
the losses in referenda in Maine and California served both as ugly examples of homophobia to
non-LGB Americans and as reasons for LGB people to engage in activism.
K. The Viability of Civil Unions
One method by which the advocates of marriage equality have sought to deflect backlash
in the past has been with the acceptance of civil unions instead of full civil marriage. Civil
unions used to be seen as an intermediate step between no marriage and full civil marriage when
the acquisition of full civil marriage for same-sex couples was seen as politically infeasible.
Civil unions did not exist as a legal concept until the Vermont legislature enacted its civil unions
law in 2000, but some469 saw them as a compromise whereby LGB people received all the
benefits of marriage except the name. Today, there is much less impetus to fight for civil unions,
and the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation are less willing to compromise by
accepting them. As Cathcart explained, there is no “juice” for civil unions anymore—no one
lobbies for them because “what people are seeing is other states getting marriage…that’s what
people want.”470 Cathcart did acknowledge that civil unions, “while a compromise, were at least
a compromise that moved things forward,” and brought marriage equality activists closer to their
ultimate goal of marriage equality.471
Robinson agreed with Cathcart and stated that civil unions were a huge step forward in
Vermont in 2000, but that they would have been a massive step backward in Massachusetts in
469
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2004.472 Robinson never liked civil unions, seeing them as “less than fully equal” because one of
the benefits of being married “is the status of being married.”473 The desirability of civil unions
to Robinson depended on the long-term strategy of the organizations litigation marriage equality,
which was marriage, meaning civil unions were a bittersweet compromise.474 Murray agreed
with Robinson and Cathcart, but argued that Windsor, not Goodridge really turned the tide
against civil unions in favor of marriage.475 Esseks offered a similar analysis, arguing they
“were never a necessary compromise,” but that they were progress.476 Bonauto offered two
observations about civil unions. First, Vermont’s civil union law was “bittersweet” because it
was “not everything [advocates for marriage equality] wanted, but it was incredible to get it.”477
Second, even though civil unions offered LGB people unprecedented legal protections, “it was
not the same thing” as marriage, but was “a separate system for gay people, and it rankled.”478
Due to all of these sentiments, key members of the organizations involved in litigation and
lobbying for marriage equality at this moment in time no longer look to civil unions as a
stepping-stone to marriage. Instead, key attorneys are now of the belief that marriage is
attainable without such stepping-stones.
L. Legal Strategy
Once the advocates of marriage equality reach the courtroom, they can focus on legal
arguments and worry to a lesser degree about the political aspects of the marriage equality
campaign. While the attorneys in the this study were in agreement on the intersection of the law
and politics, the reality of resistance to legal victories, and the need to address both the political
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and the legal spheres with regard to marriage equality cases, they were rather divided on legal
strategy. The attorneys interviewed for this study were divided on the issues of whether an
attorney from an organization dedicated to marriage equality goes to court for the client or the
cause, and whether it is better to use Due Process or Equal Protection arguments. For all the ink
spilled over the legal strategies of advocates for marriage equality, there is no real consensus.
On the issue of whether attorneys from organizations dedicated to marriage equality go to
court for the plaintiffs in marriage cases or the broader cause, Esseks explained that an attorney
from an organization dedicated to the advancement of marriage equality always tries to ensure
the interests of the individuals and the cause line up, but that the attorney always represents the
interests of the individual clients above all else.479 Bonauto agreed, stating that clients always
come first if there is conflict between their desires and the desires of the broader cause because
“as an attorney [one has] an absolute obligation to the clients.”480 However, Bonauto did qualify
that statement by noting that the attorneys do, “explain to…potential plaintiffs that they are
effectively ambassadors, that this case is beyond them.”481 Even when this is explained,
sometimes the clients do not want to do what the attorneys from marriage equality organizations
want them to do. For Bonauto, this was especially present in employment lawsuits, not marriage
litigation. Oftentimes, Bonauto’s clients in employment discrimination lawsuits simply wanted
to get a settlement and move on with their lives, whereas GLAD wanted to create binding
precedent by taking the cases to higher appellate courts.482 Even though she also wanted to
create binding precedent, Bonauto had to obey her clients’ wishes.
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Murray agreed with Bonauto that an attorney always represents his or her clients above
all else. Like Bonauto, Murray explained that plaintiffs in marriage equality cases “understand
that they represent other people, and the discrimination they’ve suffered is emblematic of the
discrimination others have suffered.”483 Robinson also agreed, citing an example from the
broader LGB rights movement of when the clients’ wishes and the movement’s goals were not
aligned. According to Robinson, in marriage cases, “the tensions you might have are
significantly diminished because the plaintiffs who participate in a test case are people whose
goal is to do something that is good for the movement, and they are not looking” to be unhelpful
for the movement.484 However, in family law cases wherein a LGB or transgender client simply
wants visitation rights with their child and not a legal statement from a higher court, the tension
between clients’ goals and the broader cause’s goals is most pronounced.485 Cathcart also
agreed, stating, “you have to go to court for the plaintiffs, but if you pick your plaintiffs properly,
and you frame your case properly, I don’t think there has to be a difference between the goals of
the plaintiffs and the goals of the movement.”486 Despite the statements of attorneys that the
desires of the organizations dedicated to marriage equality and their clients can be harmonized, it
appears that, on balance, the tradeoff between representing clients and representing a cause is so
fraught that movement attorneys, like Cathcart Murray and Bonauto, must avoid that tradeoff.
To Cathcart, the alignment of the two sets of goals is made easier by the fact that marriage
equality cases are about “clear-cut constitutional issues” such as the fundamental right to marry
and the state’s equal treatment of individuals.487
Despite this broad consensus among the aforementioned attorneys, Wolfson argued,
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The priority is always to be thinking about the broader impact…you have to be very transparent about
that when you take the case, and need to have an understanding on the part of the plaintiffs that they
too will prioritize the broader concerns of the movement and the law change we’re all seeking rather
than win at any cost on their own.488

Although Wolfson did emphasize the fact that the plaintiffs would be aware of the prioritization
of the organization’s goals, he did break from the rest of the attorneys involved in this study by
so strongly emphasizing the cause over the clients.
On another fundamental question of legal strategy in marriage equality litigation –
whether to employ Due Process of Equal Protection arguments – the attorneys in this study were
also divided or were unsure. The choice of legal arguments can have profound impact on the
relationship between the legal and political arguments the advocates of marriage equality make.
For example, Bonauto believes the best way to talk to people about marriage is to focus on the
dignity of marriage and the right to marriage, not on economic benefits. In terms of
constitutional doctrine, emphasizing the dignity of marriage fits better within Due Process
reasoning, whereas focusing on the economic benefits of marriage makes more sense as an Equal
Protection argument. Although the attorneys in this study insisted the legal and political
arguments do not substantively influence each other, they did indicate that the two types of
arguments argue the same thing: denial of marriage to same-sex couples is unfair. Selection of a
certain argument in court determines whether that actually happens.
Murray argued that, at least in Vermont, the Equal Protection arguments were the better
arguments.489 In the Vermont state constitution, Equal Protection arguments are usually based
on the Common Benefits Clause, which serves the same purpose as the Equal Protection Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.490 Murray based her belief on her
understanding of the Vermont state constitution—that it was written with the goal of “not
[having] any people who were privileged over others.”491 This convinced Murray before Baker
was even argued that the Common Benefits arguments would fare better than Due Process
arguments.
In contrast, Bonauto, who served as Murray’s co-counsel in Baker, prefers Due Process
arguments in marriage equality cases. While Bonauto does think that both types of arguments
need to be included in every marriage equality brief, “there is something simple and elegant”
about Due Process arguments.492 To Bonauto, the argument that “we are all Americans, and if
there are certain fundamental rights guaranteed to all Americans, what is the excuse for saying
this one group of Americans can’t participate [?]” is a more common sense approach that many
can grasp than Equal Protection arguments.493 As an added bonus, using the fundamental rights
language of Due Process arguments allows for the marriage equality advocates to talk about
marriage itself, and not just the technical benefits and protections that stem from it.494 Bonauto
has also gone on record against the argument that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples
constitutes sex discrimination. To Bonauto, “there is no discrimination because men and women
are equally disadvantaged,” since a couple of men that wish to be married face the same
discrimination as a couple of women.495
Robinson argued that all types of arguments – statutory, Due Process and Equal
Protection – need to be included in legal briefs because “my view of what the strongest argument
490
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was and somebody else’s view of what the strongest arguments was weren’t necessarily the
same,” and she could not predict with certainty which arguments would carry the day with the
court as a whole.496 To illustrate the fact that different arguments appealed to different people,
necessitating the inclusion of all valid arguments, Robinson cited the two moot courts the Baker
counsel held before orally arguing Baker before the Vermont Supreme Court. The first moot
court session consisted of a panel of gay, feminist, and other progressive thinkers and
progressive lawyers. The consensus of that group was that attorneys in Baker “should lead with
the sex discrimination argument.”497 However, the next moot court session consisted of a panel
of straight men, mostly unengaged from the LGB rights movement. The consensus from that
group was “you need to drop the sex discrimination argument – it is your worst argument – and
you need to lead with the fundamental right to marry.”498 “The lesson is that…this is an issue
that is not only legally subject to a range of analyses, but it strikes people fundamentally in
different ways,” and advocates need to be cognizant of this fact.499
Wolfson agreed with Robinson with regard to not having to choose between the two
types of arguments. Wolfson also argued that marriage equality advocates have won cases due
to both types of arguments, so one is not especially better than the other.500 Esseks was also
split, but on a personal preference level. Esseks personally “is a big fan of the fundamental right
to marry” because everyone agrees that such a right exists; the fight is merely over whether
same-sex couples are covered by it.501 However, he is also aware that “we have won [with] the
Equal Protection argument much more than we have won [with] the fundamental right
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argument.”502 Cathcart was even more non-committal, stating that “we’ll know the answer to
that question [whether Due Process or Equal Protection arguments are stronger] when we have a
win at the Supreme Court, and at the moment,” one cannot prejudice any type of argument for
fear of losing an effective tool.503
Each of the lawyers interviewed on the topic of legal strategy gave a different answer
over whether Equal Protection or Due Process arguments are stronger. While this has not
seemed to create dissention and disunity within and among the organizations litigating marriage
equality, it is impressive that after decades of litigation and many successes, attorneys are still
unsure as to which argument is best. The attorneys were also mostly in agreement that one must,
as an attorney, represent the wishes of one’s client, but also stressed the organization’s goal of
marriage equality had to be achieved through those clients. Many of the attorneys solved this
riddle by selecting clients with the same goals as the organization, while Wolfson argued the
cause’s goals were paramount in any test case. The consensus legal strategy of the attorneys
therefore appears to be to select clients with identical goals as the organization representing
them, and to employ every valid argument against anti-marriage equality law and constitutional
amendments.
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VII. Conclusion
As was apparent throughout the interviews in this study, the environment surrounding the
issue of marriage equality has changed dramatically over the past decade and even in the past
year. Windsor and the shift in public opinion in the United States to a majority of Americans
supporting marriage equality have completely changed the circumstances the advocates for
marriage equality face in the courtroom and out. The coming years may bring even more
dramatic changes, such as a decision from the United States Supreme Court mandating marriage
equality in all states.
This thesis found that the attorneys in major marriage equality organizations do not
necessarily accept the entire backlash hypothesis, but do understand that the law and politics are
inextricably linked with regard to marriage equality litigation campaigns. Organizations
litigating marriage equality cases understand that resistance to favorable court decisions is not
only common but also able to be mitigated by robust public education and political advocacy.
This demonstrates the internalization of the backlash hypothesis, even if some attorneys prefer to
not use the term “backlash.” However, the internalization of the backlash hypothesis is not
complete by attorneys in the marriage equality litigation campaign. In the event of a legal loss,
the interviewed attorneys argued that national and regional organizations could spin the straw of
legal defeat into political gold. The litigation losses in Washington, New York, Maryland, and
Oregon spurred many people to fight harder for the right to marry in the legislature, and also
awakened non-LGB people to issues LGB people face with regard to marriage discrimination.
The losses in Maine and California in the political sphere had a similar educational and
radicalizing effect. Further research is warranted to explore this interesting twist the marriage
equality organizations put on the traditional backlash hypothesis. With this nuance in the
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organizations’ internalization of the backlash hypothesis, the organizations still accept the main
provision of that hypothesis: negative repercussions will most likely occur after legal victories.
The desire to mitigate negative repercussions to victories for marriage equality in court
drives strategy of marriage equality advocacy organizations when it comes to selecting clients,
marshalling amici curiae, and managing political campaigns that accompany litigation. Clients
are selected to appeal to as broad a spectrum of American society as possible, and to refute
common prejudices about same-sex couples, such as the belief that they cannot raise children.
Amici are also selected to rebut those arguments and to signal to the courts that vast swaths of
society accept marriage equality. These two processes involve legal institutions, but the
arguments that the amici and plaintiffs make, both explicitly and implicitly, are political. The
amicus curiae brief of hundreds of businesses in Windsor did little to advance any legal
arguments, but it sent a strong political message to the Supreme Court about how a vast swath of
corporate America felt about marriage equality.
The marriage equality organizations’ political campaigns now emphasize “earned media”
– newspaper, radio and television reports – as well as town hall meetings and more grassroots
interaction. Civil unions, the backlash-mitigating compromise of the 2000s, are now no longer a
valid option, and the attorneys in the organizations are unwilling to accept them. The wide
swings in public opinion toward favoring marriage equality have also led the organizations to
struggle not only with resistance to legal victories, but also how to get those legal victories in the
first place now that many people will not defend anti-marriage equality laws and constitutional
amendments.
These leading marriage equality advocacy attorneys acknowledge that the law and
politics interact and intersect, but do not believe that the two influence each other. The legal and
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political arguments follow similar, if parallel tracks, with legal arguments emphasizing legal
doctrines and political arguments emphasizing the dignity of marriage and the unfairness of
marriage discrimination. Despite the imagery of railroad tracks, as the statements about plaintiff
selection and amicus curiae briefs show, political considerations drive decisions in legal aspects
of lawsuits. Attorneys deeply involved in marriage equality litigation also have no real
consensus on whether Due Process or Equal Protection arguments are more effective. The
consensus instead appears to be to include all available valid arguments in briefs and oral
arguments. This is both a legal and political decision, since the two types of arguments have
shown different levels of success when translated into political arguments. Bonauto explained
Due Process arguments are more “common sense,”504 but Esseks argued that the marriage
equality advocates have had more success in court with Equal Protection arguments. It makes
good political sense to include all arguments so that as many people as possible may be swayed
on an issue that, as Robinson explained, strikes different people in different ways. Further
research could also illuminate the political nature of lawsuit timing, to which Bonauto alluded to
when talking about the anti-DOMA litigation campaign. Even in decisions on entirely legal
matters, political considerations factor in. The politicization of the movement for marriage
equality, even though it is focused on litigation, is the main strategy of the major organizations
involved in that movement.
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